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CHAIRMAN KEENE: Good morning ladies and gentlemen. 
This is a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing -- the meeting 
of the Senate Judiciary Committee on SCA 10 and related matters. 
The requirement of unanimity in criminal jury verdicts 
is a long-standing common law tradition and is nearly uni-
versally a part of the American system of justice. All but 
five states require unanimity in misdemeanor trials. All 
but two states require unanimity in felony trials. At the 
federal level, all verdicts must be unanimous in all crimi-
nal cases. 
Since 1879 the California Constitution has provided cri-
minal defendants with a right to trial by jury, and that has 
been interpreted consistently to require unanimous jury ver-
dicts in all criminal cases. SCA 10 proposes to amend our 
Constitution to allow a non-unanimous five-sixth verdict in 
any non-capital criminal case. 
The United States Supreme Court has found no federal 
constitutional bar to having states use non-unanimous juries 
in criminal cases. Obviously it does not follow that because 
it is allowed that we should adopt the proposal. Rather the 
proponents of the measure have the obligation of demonstrat-
ing why we should abandon the unanimous jury which has always 
been a basic part of our judicial system and which has been 
considered one of the bulwarks of American freedom. They have 
a heavy burden of proof; a tradition as basic as the unani-
mous jury should not be cast aside lightly. 
In particular we need to know the effects that SCA 10 
would have on the jury system. Would it resu.lt in speedier 
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trials, with fewer hung juries and more convictions and ac-
quitals? Would it affect jury behavior and curtail full 
deliberations? What impact would it have on minority group 
representation on juries? And would it lead to greater num-
bers of filings by prosecutors? These are some of the 
questions this committee, and ultimately the voters of Cali-
fornia, will have to ask and have answered. It may well be 
that hung juries are a fact of life, rather than a consequence 
that is avoidable, and there may not be a solution to the 
problem short of abolishing the jury. 
The purpose of this interim hearing then is to see 
whether the proponents' burdens can be met. Before beginning, 
let me note that the hearing is on SCA 10 and not on the 
"Criminal Courts Procedures" initiative, which is also sup-
ported by some proponents of SCA 10. Therefore, I would en-
courage all the witnesses to speak to SCA 10 and if necessary 
to allude to the initiative but to keep it within limits of 
reasonable restraint. 
The first witness, and we are very pleased to have you, 
is Robert Philibosian, the District Attorney of Los Angeles 
County. 
MR. PHILIBOSIAN: Senator Keene, Senator Presley and 
members of the staff, thank you very much for inviting me to 
participate in your hearing this morning. I am the sponsor 
of SCA 10 with Senator Bob Presley as the author. 
SCA 10 does not have as its goal more convictions, first 
of all. Its goal is to speed up the justice process by eli-
minating retrials in cases where juries have hung by a 11 to 
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1, or 10 to 2. We have found that in almost every single 
case where there has been a verdict of 11 to 1 or 10 to 2 
the holdout juror or jurors have expressed op ions to other 
members of the jury which have little or nothing to do with 
the facts or the law as stated by the judge. We find parti-
cularly in sexual assault cases that -- and we had one case 
in this county that went to trial four times. having hung 11 
to 1 three of those times -- in sexual assault cases we have 
found that jurors sometimes harbor some of these old myths 
about rape, and do not divulge that information on voir dire, 
no matter how lengthy or how expert the voir dire is. 
Holding those prejudices, those old myths about rape 
and reactions, or what should be the reactions of a woman in 
that type of a situation, we have found on many occasions 
that we have had to retry sexual assault cases, in effect 
retraumatize the rape victims, who has once been traumatized 
by the crime; again traumatized at the preliminary hearing; 
again traumatized at the trial. She must be traumatized at 
a retrial because one or two jurors harbor these old myths 
these old prejudicies about rape. That's just an example. 
Judge Ideman, who is going to testify after me, has a 
statement from Judge Ronald George with another particularly 
poignant illustration of what happens when one juror stymies 
the efforts of the remainder of the jury for reasons that 
really have nothing whatsoever to do with the facts or with 
the evidence. In Los Angeles County over the past two years 
approximately 15% of the felony trials have gone to hung 
juries. We estimate -- although we do not have the exact 
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figures -- we estimate that in approximately one-half of 
those cases -- so we can say about 7-1/2% overall -- juries 
have been hung 10 to 2 or 11 to 1 for guilty. Although the 
numbers are small, comparatively, to the overall numbers of 
cases tried, when we think of the trauma to those victims 
who must be retraumatized; when we think of the inconvenience 
to the witnesses who must be recalled; when we think of the 
expense to the county which must go through another trial; 
when we think of the court time taken for that case, which is 
then not available for other cases or for civil cases, we are 
talking about a substantial expenditure of time, money and 
human emotions. It is to save that time, that money, and 
those human emotions that we have proposed this legislation. 
You spoke, Senator Keene, of the long tradition of the 
unanimous jury verdict. I think it is helpful to outline 
very briefly the origin of the unanimous jury verdict. The 
origin of the unanimous jury verdict was in medieval England 
when the only people who could serve on a jury were people 
who had actual knowledge of the crime itself. We have gone 
totally away from that particular part of the tradition, so 
that now people who serve on the jury may not expressly have 
any knowledge of the crime itself. So, we can see that one-
half of that tradition is gone and we are left with the other 
half of the tradition. The half we are left with no longer 
makes any sense. No decisions are made in this country, or 
anywhere in the free world, by unanimous decision. Our Cali-
fornia Supreme Court decides matters of life and death by 4 
to 3. The U. S. Superme Court decides matters of life and 
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death by 5 to 4. The existence of that tradition at this 
point in time no longer has any use in actual procedural --
in any necessily for procedure. 
Additionally, you ask that we limit our comments on 
the Criminal Court Reform Initiative, and I'm going to limit 
my comments, except to say that this is a part of Criminal 
Court Reform Initiative and to tell you that a poll was con-
ducted in Los Angeles County about six weeks ago. It was 
conducted by DMI, which is a nationwide, nationally known 
polling organization. They conducted a countywide scienti-
fic poll, conducted just the same as a poll for, say, a 
presidential candidacy would be conducted, and they found, 
asking the question of a ballot proposition, setting forth 
a jury verdict of 10 to 2 or 11 to 1 -- asking the public 
whether they would be in favor or opposed to that particular 
ballot provision -- 72% of the respondents said that they 
would be in favor of a jury verdict of 10 to 2 or 11 to 1 
72% in favor. I have not heard of any ballot proposition or 
any candidate who has had such a landslide, either in a vote 
or in a poll. So, I think that lays to rest the concerns of 
anyone that the public -- the voters, the taxpayers -- will not 
be accepting of such a provision in the California Constitu-
tion. This poll, conducted in Los Angeles County, crossed 
all sections geographically. The results were no different 
in one geographic area than in another. The results were no 
different based on ethnic or racial lines. The results were 
no different based on the gender of the respondent. The 
composite and the individual parts remain very closely the 
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same; the composite was 72% in favor. So, I think that is 
very significant to a Legislature that is a representative 
Legislature, and seeks to respond to the will of the people. 
Thank you very much. 
CHAIRMAN: Thank you. If you would stay with us and 
respond to questions I would appreciate it. 
MR. PHILIBOSIAN: I would be happy to do so. 
CHAIRMAN: Are there any questions by a member of the 
committee -- two members of the committee. Senator Davis 
first. 
SENATOR DAVIS: Mr. Philibosian, I can support the con-
cept if I have a feeling that there will be no diminution 
of justice to an individual and if it makes the process more 
efficient. In other words, I think that we now win 90 some 
percent of cases that the District Attorney files, probably 
in general, and a very high percentage of the jury trials. 
If this preserves the ability of an innocent person to go 
free, and doesn't materially disturb the percentage of con-
victions, but doesn't require us going into additional trials, 
because of hung juries, this is probably a good idea. Is 
there any data on states that have employed this, and what 
impact it had on the percentage of convictions? 
MR. PHILIBOSIAN: There doesn't seem to be any impact 
on the percentage of convictions, and there is no public out-
cry in the states of Louisiana and Oregon against this parti-
cular procedure. The United States Supreme Court says that 
jury verdicts of 9 to 3 are acceptable under the United States 
Constitution. I'm willing to accept the finding of the United 
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States Supreme Court that there is no diminution of defen-
dants' rights, because they have specifically found that. 
SENATOR DAVIS: In those two states it has not mater-
ially increased the conviction percentage that prosecutors 
get? 
MR. PHILIBOSIAN: No. Not that I am aware of. 
SENATOR DAVIS: Now, has it materially ..... 
MR. PHILIBOSIAN: We are not seeking to increase rate 
of convictions, Senator. 
SENATOR DAVIS: OK. That's what I want to make clear. 
I'm for more expedient justice as long as it's still justice. 
Has there been evidence that it has reduced the amount of 
time that courts and prosecutors, and everyone else involved 
in the process, are engaged in it? 
MR. PHILIBOSIAN: I'm not aware of any specific studies 
in those states that reflect that. I simply earlier, I think, 
before you arrived, quoted the statistic that 15% of the jury 
trials -- criminal jury trials in Los Angeles County -- re-
sult in hung juries. Our estimate, although we do not have 
the actual figures, our estimate is about half of that 15% 
or about 7-1/2% overall -- are hung 11 to 1 or 10 to 2 for 
guilty, and it is those cases which we seek to avoid retrying, 
avoid retraumatizing those victims, and having the witnesses 
come forward again, and to save the expense of time involved. 
CHAIRMAN KEENE: Senator Presley. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: Mr. Chairman, you indicate the pro-
ponents of this bill, and I certainly am one, as the author, 
and I am very strongly in support of this concept and change 
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in the Constitution; and you indicated that the burden of 
proof was on us very strongly to prove that. I didn't know 
about the 72%. I'm very glad to hear that number one, the 
exhibit of proof -- the burden of proof is on us. The peo-
ple out there that this affects strongly support it, and if 
it does get through the Legislature and on the ballot, there 
is a strong assumption that it will pass~ 
The other point I want to make is that, in terms of bur-
den of proof, I know that analysis was written somewhere 
along the line when SCA 10 was introduced last February, that 
says support unknown, and I don't quite know why we weren't 
ahlc to identify the support for this bill, because they cer-
tainly haven't been in the closet. Mr. Philibosian, would 
you enumerate for us, for the record, the groups that, to 
your knowledge, are in support of the bill. 
MR. PHILIBOSIAN: Well, to my knowledge the California 
District Attorneys Association; the State Chamber of Commerce; 
the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce; State Sheriff's Assoc-
iation; California Peace Officers Association. I'm not sure 
whether the State Chiefs have gone on record. Have they? 
Yes, they have -- California Police Chiefs Association. All 
of those groups are in favor; numerous individuals including 
myself, Judge Ronald George, speaking for himself, but he 
is the former President of the California Judges Association; 
and the current Supervising Judge of Criminal Departments in 
Los Angeles County Superior Court; Judge Jim Ideman, who is 
here, who is the Assistant Supervising Judge for Criminal Depart-
ments, and speaking for himself, but certainly an individual 
worthy of note. The Sheriff of Los Angeles County, Sherman 
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Block, who will be here later this morning to testify be-
fore this committee. So, there are a number of proponent 
groups and proponent individuals. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: Mr. Chairman, also by what date --
this is a Constitutional Amendment, so we are not stuck with 
a date, are we, in January? 
CHAIRMAN KEENE: I think the only date depends on which 
ballot one would contemplate putting it on. There is some 
period in advance of that by which the Secretary of State 
has to have knowledge that it has passed the Legislature. 
We can check that for you, unless staff knows. 
MR. THOMSON: There is no legislative deadline because 
it's a Constitutional Amendment. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: All right, we will just have to de-
termine which election we are headed for, primary or gen-
eral, and try to have it heard in sufficient time before the 
committee. 
MR. PHILIBOSIAN: Let me just, if I may, wrap up a bit 
with one statement. Parenthetically I will supply to this 
committee an excerpt from the poll, which shows the percen-
tages. I'll bring that in later this morning. But, just to 
kind of wrap up in terms of placing this on the ballot, I 
think regardless of the individual thoughts or philosophies 
of the members of the committee, I think that certainly the 
people of the state should have the opportunity to vote on 
this particular Constitutional Amendment. We have seen in 
one county -- Los Angeles County, which is a fairly repre-
senatative county of the state -- an overwhelming number of 
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voters who are in favor of this particular legislation, this 
particular amendment, I think that the voters should have the 
opportunity to make this choice, to express their will. If 
they vote in favor of it, it becomes part of our Constitution; 
if they vote against it then the proponents are wrong in 
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thinking that this is what the public wants and we will fold 
our tents and will go away. But, I would urge that this com-
mittee pass this bill out so that it may be out before the 
voters so we may hear the will of the people. 
CHAIRMAN: I have a couple of questions I would like to 
put to you. 
to the poll. 
The first is how much weight we ought to give 
Do you believe that the public that was polled 
was adequately informed about the issue and the implications 
of reducing the unanimous verdict to something less than that? 
MR. PHILIBOSIAN: Well, as there is in any poll, Sena-
tor, one asks the question; one doesn't go through a lengthy 
discussion of the merits or demerits; proponents or opponents; 
the pluses and minuses; one simply asks the question and re-
ceives a response from the electorate. If it were close 
if it were 51 to 49%, then perhaps we could say that an edu-
cational campaign would perhaps sway the opponents or the 
proponents among the public. But, when we have such an over-
whelming response, I doubt whether any educational campaign 
would change that kind of a response -- would turn it around 
completely. I think people are generally aware; we have a 
very well informed electorate in Los Angeles County. These 
issues have been before the public ..... 
CHAIRMAN: They are not here today, however. I'm here 
to be informed by testimony such as yours. The other members 
of the committee are here; there are a few people out here in 
the audience, but the great bulk of the people are not really 
paying a great deal of attention to the issue. My own sus-
picion is that they are concerned about crime, legitimately, 
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and anything that they believe would tend to reduce the amount 
of crime in our society they would go for without neces-
sarily being aware of all the implications. So, our judg-
ment may or may not be the same as that of the public at 
large for which we get criticized constantly. But, I'm a 
Legislator who tends to believe that they buy into our judg-
ment as well as representation of what the polls show. Now 
I don't know if an educational process will change that, and 
I certainly -- it may make the statistics even more over-
whelming in favor of adoption of this kind of thing. But, 
I think it is a necessary part of the process, and I'm not 
sure the early polls ought to be relied upon to that extent. 
We may differ in that respect. I just want you to know what 
my views are. This is an important issue and we need to re-
flect honestly on the issue. 
MR. PHILIBOSIAN: Well, this poll was taken approximately 
six weeks ago. This issue has been in the newspapers, on 
television, on radio; it has been debated; the County Bar has 
taken a position; there have been editorials one way or 
another in the electronic media, as well as the print media; 
various public officials have been speaking about it. It's 
not an issue that has never before been discussed in public. 
I think it's also interesting to note, based on your comment 
that the people would be in favor of anything that they 
thought would reduce crime. In the same poll the public was 
asked whether or not they would be in favor of judicial voir 
dire -- which is another amendment that I have proposed, and 
is also part of the initiative which was heard by this com-
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mittee -- and whether or not they would be in favor of the 
full restoration of the Grand Jury process, again which is 
Senator Davis' SCA 6 and is part of the initiative. Al-
though the people were in favor of both of those separate 
propositions, the amount in favor was not as great as the 
amount in favor on this particular proposition. So, the 
public differentiated in this area, and although they may 
have perceived that all three of those procedures would do 
something about the crime problem, as you say, they differ-
entiated between those two which were relatively close in 
percentage, and this which was much higher in percentage. 
I will supply all of those figures to this committee later 
this morning. 
CHAIRMAN: Also the questions that were put to the 
public. 
MR. PHILIBOSIAN: Yes. I will supply the question and 
the percentage of responses in each of those areas. I think 
it is also interesting to note that there is one question 
that was asked of the public, whether or not their response 
would be changed if the State Bar Association indicated op-
position, and an overwhelming majority said if the Bar was 
opposed they would be in favor. 
CHAIRMAN: No comment. What percentage ..... 
}fR. PHILIBOSIAN: Something like 66%. 
CHAIRMAN: No. No. This is a different question. You 
indicated that approximately -- or I think you had data to 
show that about 15% of the felonies resulted in hung juries? 
MR. PHILIBOSIAN: Yes. That is a statistic from the 
Executive Officer of the Courts. 
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CHAIPJ1AN: In California? 
MR. PHILIBOSIAN: No, in Los Angeles 
CHAIRMAN: Oh, in Los Angeles County. 
MR. PHILIBOSIAN: That's Los Angeles 
have a statewide figure for you. 
I don't 
CHAIID,Ulli: 15% of the felonies in Los Angeles County re-
sult in hung juries. What percentage of the misdemeanors? 
Do you have any idea? 
MR. PHILIBOSIAN: They don't have statistics on mis-
demeanors. 
CHAIRMAN: They don't? What percentage of the cases 
are hung 11 to 1? 
MR. PHILIBOSIAN: We don't those figures are not 
kept. Our best estimate, based on discussions with our pro-
secutors, who have had hung juries, is approximately half 
of the hung juries are hung 11 to 1 or 10 to 2 for guilty. 
CHAIRMAN: What is the empirical basis for that -- the 
estimated half? 
MR. PHILIBOSIAN: There is none. 
CHAIRMAN: So, the prosecutors say well, about half of 
them hang up. 
MR. PHILIBOSIAN: Half of the ones who hang up hang 
11 to 1 or 10 to 2 for guilty. It is those cases that we are 
going after, where 10 or 11 people are convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, and one or two 
hold out, usually for reasons that have nothing to do with 
law or nothing to do with evidence. 
CHAIRMAN: If this is an issue that has been before the 
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public for some period of time, wouldn't it be useful to have 
statistics and to know whether that estimate is anywhere near 
to correct, and not just an impression, so t we could 
know what percentage of the cases hang up at 11 to 1 and 10 
to 2? 
MR. PHILIBOSIAN: Those statistics have not been kept. 
It's almost impossible to go back and try to reconstruct them 
at this point in time. 
CHAIRMAN: But couldn't we start keeping them? Shouldn't 
we have started ..... 
MR. PHILIBOSIAN: Yes, and we are. 
CHAIRMAN: Can't we start for a year before you ..... 
MR. PHILIBOSIAN: No. No. We haven't. 
CHAIRMAN: You don't need the data that badly? 
MR. PHILIBOSIAN: Well, it hasn't been done. 
CHAIID1AN: Let me ask you another question. I have been 
trying to reflect on this issue without a great deal of ad-
vance prejudice simply based on the institution and the fact 
that we've used unanimous in California since the 1879 Con-
stitution, at least. It strikes me that you can have an 
obstinate person, a corrupt individual; you can have an in-
dividual who is so narrow-minded on a jury that that individual 
will never be persuaded by the others, no matter how per-
suasive their arguments you gave the rape case and the 
myths held about a rape. I understand all that. I suppose 
that happens a certain percentage of the time and because we 
don't really have empirical data, but just impressions, I 
don't know what percentage of the time that is. But, if it's 
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1 in 100 times -- 100 jurors -- you get one of those, the 
prospect of getting two of those on the same jury is going 
to be 1 in 10,000 -- 100 times 100. Now, if we go after 
1 in 100 situation, why do we also have to go after the 1 in 
10,000 situation? Why do we have to allow a 10-2? Why 
couldn't we just move to an 11-1 and to take care of that 
situation where you have a juror who simply won't be con-
vinced no matter what the evidence shows? 
MR. PHILIBOSIAN: 10-2 is already a compromise posi-
tion, Senator. The United States Supreme Court says 9 to 
3 is sufficient. 
CHAIR}~N: I'm not talking law or politics, I'm talking 
public policy now. Why do we have to take care of that all 
too rare situation, where you have two jurors on the same 
jury, who are thought to be obstinate, corrupt, or unable 
to be persuaded by reason? 
MR. PHILIBOSIAN: Because generally our finding is that 
it's not more than two, but it is two more often-- it's two 
more often than three, let's put it that way. It's one more 
often than two, and we are seeking to alleviate the problem 
in one fell swoop in effect. If we run into situations where 
two people are hanging up the jury, then we want to take care 
of that also. And those are the situations which would be 
far more common than three. We feel we are on very safe con-
stitutional grounds because of the United States Supreme 
Court decision. So, it's already a compromise position. 
CHAIRMAN: It is a compromise, I guess, but I wonder if 
it's a compromise in the best interest of justice. I agree 
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with you that you can get that individual who screws up the 
process a certain percentage of the time, and that percen-
tage may be -- I don't know how high it is. But, the pro-
spect of getting two seems to me is infinitely less, and the 
prospect of getting three is far, far less than that -- so 
small that you wouldn't need to worry about it -- and yet 
we are moving to a 10 to 2. I don't think that's the right 
thing to do at this point. If we are going to change the 
institution, if we're going to change the structure, it seems 
to me that we ought to change it in the direction of 11-1. 
And if empirically we can show that there are enough problems 
to justify that, I'm willing to support it. I horrified some 
of the local community when I first took over this chair-
manship and said we ought to consider that. I think we ought 
to consider that. The 10 to 2 does trouble me. I just want you 
to know again what my views are on the thing. 
MR. PHILIBOSIAN: Of course 9 to 3 is based on the 
civil jury which makes a decision 9 to 3, and with only a 
preponderance of the evidence -- far less than beyond a 
reasonable doubt. That's the basis of 9 to 3. 
CHAIRMAN: ~Je do a lot of things by simple majority in 
the State of California and in the country. Imposing taxes 
is not one of them in California that we do by a simple ma-
jority anymore. The analogies though to the California 
Supreme Court, which functions on a simple majority basis 
4 to 3, or the U. S. Supreme Court 5 to 4 -- I don't think 
are necessarily good analogies, because at least under the 
constitutional theory they are supposed to be resolving 
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legal issues -- disputes about the law, not disputes about 
facts, and the laggeries that decide these disputes about 
facts are in different situations, because factual questions 
perhaps ought to require a higher majority. And you do 
allow for a higher majority in a 10 to 2. But, I'm not sure 
that that's the right break off point, and I'm not sure the 
analogy holds. We have a group in society that simply ques-
tions the fact or makes public policy, or something like 
that. We do believe in majority rule, because the factual 
determination that they make is indelible; it's final and 
it's rare that an appellate court will overturn something 
on the lack of evidence to come to that conclusion. So, I 
think we need to be careful in this area that we don't draw 
on wrong analogies. 
I'm sorry, I didn't mean to get into that much speech-
making this morning, but I wanted to share my views with 
you at this stage, and I'm willing to be persuaded, and I'm 
willing to move in the direction that you would like to move 
in. I'm not sure I would like to move as fast and as far 
as you would like to go, even though you indicate you are not 
moving as far and as fast as you could move. Thank you very 
much. 
MR. PHILIBOSIAN: Thank you very much, Senator. 
CHAIRMAN: Senator Davis. 
SENATOR DAVIS: I would just like to say at this point, 
I'm very happy that you are the District Attorney of Los 
Angeles County. 
CHAIRMAN: Judge James Ideman. Nice to have you with 
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us, although I must admit as a former classmate of Judge Ron 
George, I would have been happy to see him this morning as 
well. 
JUDGE IDEMAN: Well, he regrets very much that he can-
not be here, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Senator Davis, 
Senator Presley. 
CHAIRMAN KEENE: He is becoming a morning television 
personality, I understand. 
JUDGE IDEMAN: Yes, he has. I watched him on TV. He 
wasn't on very long, if you happened to ..... 
CHAIRMAN KEENE: I heard about it. I missed it. I 
wish I had been able to catch it. 
JUDGE IDEMAN: I have a statement from Judge George 
which I would like to read to the committee, with your per-
mission. I am also here on my own behalf and I will have 
something to say after I read Judge George's statement. 
"I regret having been called out of town and being un-
able to attend this hearing, but I wish to endorse whole-
heartedly the provisions of SCA 10, which would permit 
conviction in non-capital criminal cases by a 10 to 2 or 11 
to 1 vote, apart from the unanimous vote presently required. 
This is a statement of my personal position, and is not in-
tended to represent the position of the court. In my exper-
ience the one or two holdout jurors for aquittal and a hung 
jury typically are individuals who refuse to deliberate with 
their fellow jurors and who have preconceived biases preclud-
ing the giving of any consideration to a conviction in the 
case before them. 
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"A typical example reported in the attached clippings 
from the October 5, 1983 editions of the Los Angeles Times 
and the Los Angeles Herald Examiner involved a federal pro-
secution in Los Angeles arising out of a large-scale inter-
national child pornography operation. A solitary, unreasonable 
holdout juror sabotaged the case. The juror who deadlocked 
the jury with the only not guilty vote, is described in the 
articles as having appeared not to listen to most of the 
testimony, and having admitted not hearing any of the tape 
recordings. The holdout juror announced almost immediately 
after the case was submitted to the jury that he would never 
vote for a conviction. He referred to defense witnesses, who 
did not testify, and stated that all law enforcement officers 
are liars, indicating, 'I didn't want to be on this jury to 
start with,' and 'let another jury convict her.' According 
to other jurors the holdout juror 'sat in a chair, his back 
to the other 11 reading a book. '" 
CHAIRMAN: Isn't that an argument against changing voir 
dire? 
JUDGE IDEYUU1: I have a remark too about that myself. 
I'm also here in my own capacity, again not purporting to 
represent the views of members of my court. So, my back-
ground may be of some interest to the committee. 
Prior to my election to the Bench I was for 15 years a 
deputy district attorney in Los Angeles County; I was never 
an administrator; I was always a trial lawyer. I've been 
five years on the Bench assigned to the Criminal Division, 
so I've been trying criminal cases for 20 years in Los Angeles 
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County. I'm also a Colonel in the United States Army Re-
serve, in the Judge Advocate General Corps. In that capa-
city I serve as a ~1ilitary Judge, and I go on active duty 
two weeks a year, usually to Ford Ord where I try cases by 
court-martial. With regard to the latter, the Army and the 
other Uniformed Services, for years have had a lack of unan-
imity requirement for verdicts -- two-thirds in cases where 
the possible punishment is under ten years, and three-quarters 
for cases where punishment is over ten years -- unanimous 
for capital cases only. Although the Uniformed Services in 
recent years have added substantial protections to the rights 
of the accused, this is one thing that is never tampered 
with. It works fine in the military. I realize a court-
martial is not the same as a civilian criminal trial, but 
there are important similarities, and in the end it's the 
question of whether or not the guilt of an individual is 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
With respect to my service as a trial lawyer and as a 
judge, I have tried hundreds of jury trials myself, both as 
a lawyer and as a judge. And being in the business one tends 
to discuss other cases with one's colleagues, both other 
trial lawyers and now other judges, and so one's experience 
is beyond the particular cases that we've tried ourselves. 
But it's only really expanded by the trials that other people 
have participated in. And I cannot remember in all of the 
20 years that I've been in the Criminal Justice System 
wherever it was felt by the lawyer or the judge involved 
in the case that an 11 to 1 holdout juror did so for any 
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rational basis. In every case that I can remember, it was 
a case like the one cited by Judge George -- someone put his 
back to the others, folded his arms, and d, 11Let me know 
when you are ready to acquit, I'm not going to anything 
to do with the case." 
By chance, and only by chance, I was the Trial Judge in 
the case referred to by Mr. Philibosian where the defendant 
was tried four times and ultimately freed. I would like to 
take a moment to tell you about that case. This was a case 
in which a young woman was with her fiance in Hollywood cele-
brating, I believe, their engagement. They had been to an 
Italian restaurant; they left the restaurant about 11:00 
o'clock, and they went to get the car, which was parked in 
a parking lot. They were accosted by four men who beat up 
the boyfriend, and left him bleeding and robbed on the ground 
of the parking lot -- took his wallet and his property. They 
opened the trunk of their Cadillac; they threw the young lady 
into the trunk of the Cadillac and drove off with her to a 
distance of several miles to an alley somewhere in Los Angeles, 
where she was repeatedly gang raped and sodomized, and forced 
to submit to oral copulation. The main offender, the indi-
vidual that Mr. Philibosian referred to, then took her to a 
motel where he continued to rape her throughout the night, 
ignoring the pounding of his confederates who were banging 
on the door to the motel room -- they were angry because they 
were being denied their turn by this defendant. Three of 
the four were apprehended. Two of the three pled guilty be-
fore me in a negotiated disposition for 12 years in prison, 
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which is what they got. The main offender went to trial 
four times. The first time he was tried was before me and 
the jury was 11 to l for c L The vidence on the 
defense side was that the lady had, upon seeing the four 
men and seeing them beat up the boyfriend -- the boyfriend 
had made some remark to them, so that's why he was beaten--
the robbery was denied -- and upon seeing her fiance lying 
bleeding on the parking lot, she told the men that she had 
always desired to have sex with strangers, and crawled will-
ingly into the trunk of the car, and then went down to 
wherever they took her and willingly participated with all 
of these people. It was a very implausible defense. The 
argument made to the jury was along racial lines, that there 
was talk about and illusions to lynchings in the South where 
a white woman would accuse a black man of rape, and so forth, 
and it reached its mark, and one juror, for reasons described 
by the other jurors as being completely irrational, refused 
to participate in the case, voted for not guilty, 11 to 1. 
The second time he went to trial was before another 
judge -- Judge Jerry Fields of our Court. I wasn't avail-
able at that time -- on the same evidence and that jury --
same argument -- and that jury hung up 11 to 1 for the same 
reason. 
The case then came back to me for a third trial, and by 
this time the victim was weakening. The attorney then would 
read portions of her preliminary hearing testimony and read 
testimony from the f st two trials, and obviously there was 
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some discrepancy every time a person testifies, and the jury 
also gets to know that there had been two tr s before. So, 
this case hung up 9 to 3. I thought the case was so aggra-
vated and such a miscarriage of justice was occurring that 
I decided to order an unprecedented fourth trial. Nobody 
that I have talked to in our business has known of a case 
that has been tried four times. Usually two is about it, 
and three for a case that is especially heinous or serious. 
Well, I thought this case should be tried a fourth time. 
It went to another judge -- I again was not avail-
able and this time the victim was really wearing down. 
This was her fifth time to present this testimony. And that 
jury hung up also. I think that jury was something like 7 
to 5, and the case was dismissed and the main culprit is a 
free man today. Had we had SCA 10 he would be making license 
plates well into the next century. 
CHAIPMAN KEENE: What if we had provision for an 11 to 
1 verdict? 
JUDGE IDEMAN: That would have taken care of the situa-
tion. So, I can say that, based on my experience in the 
civilian legal side, the military legal side, that I think 
SCA 10 is an idea whose time has really come. 
One other point. There is a great expenditure and waste 
of public funds now in very lengthy voir dire proceedings 
very, very lengthy questioning of jurors and far too many 
peremptory challenges are permitted. 
CHAIRMAN: Wouldn't that fellow in the first trial have 
been weeded out if the voir dire had been properly imple-
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mented, they would have found out that he did not want to 
serve on the jury. 
JUDGE IDEMAN: Well, no. There was very extensive voir 
dire in all the trials, and this voir dire failed to dis-
close this type of feeling by this person. Obviously the 
prosecutor who was a very talented Deputy District Attorney 
one of the best in the office. She now heads up, I believe, 
the sexual assault program for the DA's office-- top attor-
ney and she was unable to see this ..... 
CHAIRMAN: The connection I can't make is that he will-
ingly admitted after the jury hung up -- he said, "I never 
wanted to serve on this jury in the first place." Is that 
something ..... 
JUDGE IDEMAN: No, that was Judge George's case that 
I read you. That was a child pornography jury. 
CHAIRMAN: Oh. OK. 
JUDGE IDEMAN: The jurors in this case apparently were 
put off by racial feeling. 
CHAIRMAN: Which were not able to be disclosed --
JUDGE IDEMAN: They were not able to be disclosed. 
There was question about those feelings, but it didn't turn 
up, and the juror was permitted to serve in each case. 
CHAIRMAN: Yet, you know that was the basis for the 
judgment of the holdouts. 
JUDGE IDEMAN: Oh, yes, because the other jurors were 
quite incensed by it and spoke to the attorneys afterwards. 
Now, the last point I would like to make is this. A 
lot of time is now wasted in extensive voir dire and many 
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peremptory challenges. One of the justifications for very, 
very careful voir dire, and for the use of many peremptory 
challenges is attempting to weed out the type of person that 
would arbitrarily hang up a jury, and I know there are other 
moves afoot to cut down on voir dire, and cut down on per-
emptories, and this seems to me to dovetail nicely because 
if you don't have to worry that much about the one odd or 
the two odd people that will irrationally hang up a jury, 
then the reason for extensive voir dire, and the reason for 
a large number of peremptory challenges also is ameliorated. 
So, I think that the savings would be far beyond the con-
viction of people who would have gotten off on 11 to 1 or 
10 to 2 verdicts before. Thank you. I'll be happy tore-
spond to any questions. 
CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Any questions by members of the 
committee of Judge Ideman? Thank you very much. That was 
very interesting and informative. Please say 11hello" to 
Judge George for me. 
JUDGE IDEl~N: I shall. 
CHAIRMAN: Professor Alan Scheflin. 
PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN: Mr. Chairman, members of the com-
mittee, I appreciate the opportunity to be called here to 
testify in reference to this proposed amendment to the Cali-
fornia Constitution. I have written extensively on juries 
and have been quoted in court opinions and by judges and 
speeches; I've often been a consultant on jury issues. Per-
haps my expertise here is based on my having authored chapters 
on non-unanimous jury verdicts and jury selection procedures, 
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a book that I understand has been basic to the thinking 
of your staff counsel. 
What T propose Lo do is Lo t:llk nhouL the history and 
the considerations involved in non-unanimous jury verdicts. 
Let me start by saying that juries in criminal cases have 
decided unanimous jury verdicts for over 600 years with very 
few moments in time as exceptions. Therefore, the gravity 
of the proposal that we consider today seems to me is fairly 
obvious. I appreciate the opportunity to be heard for that 
reason. 
When we turn to history we find a number of arguments, 
none unfortunately compelling as to the unanimity requirement. 
Unfortunately the history of the unanimity rule is shrouded 
in mystery, and of the many different theories virtually none 
of them apply to the legal procedures that we have today. 
We know this at least, that the right to a jury is a sacred 
right, starts in 1215 with the Magna Carta, and that by 1367 
all experiments with non-unanimous juries were repealed and 
the unanimity requirement became the law of the land, as well 
as the law of our land. Legal historians Pollack and Maitland 
wrote, "From the moment of our historical records in the 
very beginning we seem to see a strong desire for unanimity." 
That certainly is true. In the original draft of the 6th 
Amendment the House of Representatives put in language that 
would make unanimity a "requisite." That language was 
stricken by the Senate, because the Senate believed that a 
jury had to be unanimous, was in fact what the definition of 
a jury was. So, the absence of language in the 6th Amendment 
-26-
requiring unanimity stems from the Senate's belief that 
unanimity and jury are synonymous terms. 
I've said that the historical arguments for the most 
part are not conclusive, and I, therefore, will not go 
through them. All of them relate to procedures that are not 
part of our legal system today. What is relevant, however, 
is the Supreme Court's determination of the constitutionality 
of the unanimity rule, a determination based not only on his-
torical analysis, according to Justice White, but rather on 
a functional analysis of what the jury is. And I would like 
to focus on the functional analysis, which Justice \~ite, I 
think, in surprisingly stark language, language which has 
been repeated in several Supreme Court cases, said the right 
of a jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order 
to prevent oppression by government. He said further, the 
framers of the Constitution strove to create an independent 
judiciary, but insisted upon further protection against ar-
bitrary action. Providing the accused with the right to be 
tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safe-
guard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and 
against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge. I will 
add more to that when we talk about the political considera-
tions of juries. But, it's clear that the Supreme Court 
believes that the issue of unanimity as a constitutional 
matter is geared toward the function of the jury, and that 
the function of the jury is to interpose a community body 
between the defendant and the prosecutorial powers of the 
state. In that regard, when we turn to the cases themselves 
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they seem surprisingly to ignore that constitutional test. 
Let me, for your benefit, run through very quickly the 
history of Supreme Court 
are only a few. In 1968 
cisions this matter. There 
U. S. Supreme Court decided 
Duncan vs. Louisiana, holding that the 14th Amendment guar-
antees to state criminal defendants a right to trial by jury. 
In 1970 that right was extended by a plurality of Baldwin vs. 
New York to all non-petty criminal offenses. A non-petty 
offense is defined at least as one that carries a six-month 
or more potential sentence. In 1970 in Williams vs. Florida 
the Supreme Court decided that a six-member jury in state 
criminal cases is in fact constitutional. Based on language 
that it would be the functional equivalent for the purpose 
of interposing the community between the state and the pro-
secutor, the court could see no reason why a six-member jury 
would function any differently than a 12-mernber jury. In 
point of fact, as the near unanimous literature on small group 
decision-making suggests, the court was error in that 
conclusion. Nevertheless the issue before us is not the size 
of the jury, but rather the unanimity rule. In 1972 the U. S. 
Supreme Court decided Johnson vs. Louisiana and Apodaca vs. 
Oregon, upholding state criminal jury trial verdicts of 9 to 
3 and 10 to 2. Once again the court said that a functional 
analysis of the jury permits a less than unanimous verdict, 
thereby authorizing the states to in fact provide for ma-
jority verdicts in criminal cases. There is no question in 
my mind, therefore, that the proposed Amendment is in fact 
a valid exercise of constitutional authority by the state. 
The question is whether or not it is a wise exercise of 
that power, not whether it is a legitimate exercise of 
that power. 
Let me just as a footnote point out that we know from 
two further Supreme Court decisions that a jury of a non-
unanimous jury of less than 6, or a unanimous jury of less 
than 6 is constitutionally impermissible. In that regard, 
as I think you have already noted in one of your position 
papers, the bill as written is potentially unconstitutional, 
and will need to have some of the language changed. Accord-
ing to the California Constitution there is the possibility 
in misdemeanor cases for agreement on a less than 12-member 
jury. That would seem in light of the proposed amendment 
here to be impossible. I'm not sure how you would get five-
sixths decisions out of less than a 12-member jury, unless 
it's a 6-member jury. If it's a 6-member jury then it's 
clearly in violation of Ballew vs. Georgia, a U. S. Supreme 
Court decision, and Birch vs. Louisiana, a U. S. Supreme 
Court decision. And so, as it is presently written, there is 
a constitutional infirmity in the bill. I assume that to be 
a minor matter, but nevertheless it does exist. 
The question of the wisdom, as opposed to the power, to 
decide non-unanimous verdicts it seems to me is why we are 
here, and in that regard I follow the wise words of Alexis 
de Toqueville that "the jury is both a judicial and a 
political institution." As a judicial institution, in 
fact\ the jury plays a statistically small and perhaps even 
statistically insignificant role in the criminal justice 
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system. Of all criminal cases in California, as is true 
nationwide, 9 out of 10 cases are plea bargained or settled 
without jury disposition. In the 1 out of 10 cases that 
is settled, that is not plea bargained, a percentage of 
those cases will be decided by non-jury decision-making 
defendants will choose not to have a jury trial. We're talk-
ing approximately of 8% of all of the criminal cases in 
California. Of that 8% the overwhelming number, approximately 
90% will be decided by unanimous verdict. So, in fact we 
are talking about one-tenth of one-tenth of the criminal 
cases in California. I will take questions by the way. 
Therefore, the actual application of this bill will be 1 out 
of every 100 cases in California at best, and probably even 
a fewer number than that. And so the judicial significance 
of this bill, and therefore, the question of its cost and 
time effectiveness, it seems to me need to be put in per-
spective. This bill willnot save very much time, nor will 
it save very much money. It will save time and it will save 
money, that's clear, but the amount of time and money I think 
will be statistically insign icant, and in any event it must 
be measured against the price which must be paid for the jury 
as a political institution. 
CHAIRMAN: Senator Presley. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: You're talking about cost. How do 
you measure the injustice that was just described by Judge 
Ideman? 
PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN: Yes. I agree with you, Senator. 
It seems to me that what I heard did appear to reflect a 
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terrible injustice. But, let's put what we heard in proper 
perspective. He were told by the good Judge that in this 
particular instance a criminal defendant was tried four times. 
We were also told that most hung juries result because of 
biased, or corrupt, or unthinking, unfeeling jurors. Now 
what we were told, in other words, is that in four separate 
juries they would have turned up at least four, but in terms 
of his statistics, five, six or seven biased, corrupt jurors. 
That strains my credulity. I'm sorry. I don't believe it. 
In fact, it seems to me that hung juries are not essentially 
the product of biased jurors, or corrupt jurors. There is 
no question that instances of that do occur, and this may 
very well be one of them, although we have to say it happened 
four times seriatim. If we were to take this particular case 
as a standard then we would have hung juries so much more 
frequently than we do now. I just find it hard to believe 
that four separate juries would hang up in the same case four 
separate times because four biased individuals would be found 
in a fact pattern that seems so elaringly oriented towards 
a conviction. There must be some other explanation. I sug-
gest to you the explanation is that prosecutorial inartfulness 
or incompetence is one of the major sources of hung juries, 
where the jury in fact wants to convict, but the prosecutor 
has failed to meet the burden of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and a conscientious juror will respond to that by say-
ing, "I may in my heart of hearts believe this defendant is 
guilty, but I've taken a solemn oath to not convict except 
on proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the prosecutor has 
failed to deliver that proof." 
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SENATOR PRESLEY: Well, I guess the only response to that 
would be, as testified here, to get more competent deputy 
district attorneys in the Distr t Attorney's office. 
PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN: And that may very well be. There 
may have been an insufficiency of evidence. I can't address 
it baffles and saddens me, I think in the same way that it 
does you. But, I can't say that the explanation is that 
half a dozen corrupt individuals wouriu up sitting on four 
different juries in the same case. The statistical likeli-
hood of that happening is very, very remote. I would rather 
say there is some other explanation, which we may not be 
aware of. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: The only other thought I would have 
as long as I have you interrupted -- would be a comment. 
It seems to me we certainly have to have the ability to 
adapt to change, and this is a vastly different world than 
it was 600 years ago. We are now certainly in a modern age, 
the electronic age, the nuclear age, as we saw a couple of 
nights ago. To hang on to the fact that historically this 
was the way it has been for 600 years, I would rather look 
at it that we are in a different time, circumstances are 
different and we should have constitutional provisions 
adapt. 
PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN: I agree with you wholeheartedly, 
Senator. That's why I thought the arguments -- the histori-
cal arguments were inconclusive and in fact irrelevant. I 
don't think it would be appropriate to draw from the lon-
gevity of the unanimity, the functional necessity of una-
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nimity, and that the fact that we've had something for 600 
years does not necessarily speak well of it. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: I guess I misunderstood you. I 
thought you were hanging on the historical aspects ..... 
PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN: On the contrary, I agree with you ..... 
SENATOR PRESLEY: There is no question about the con-
stitutionality of it. That has already been decided. 
PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN: Yes, I think that the historical 
reasons are best left to history, for the unanimity rule. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: If you are not opposed historically, 
and you are not opposed constitutionally, let me be speci-
fic: Why are you opposed? 
PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN: I'm opposed politically. To ad-
dress the question I think that was asked of a former speaker 
by Senator Davis, whether or not the increase in efficiency 
would also signal a decrease in justice, I believe that it 
would. I believe that we would get a worse quality of 
justice and find more severe horror stories, if in fact we 
pass this amendment. I have no question that the histori-
cal reasons and the constitutional reasons are sufficient 
to say that there is the power. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: So, you are not concerned about the 
fact that we could have deterioration of justice? 
PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN: No. I'm concerned about the fact 
that we will have a deterioration of justice. It seems to 
me that that is both inevitable and commonsensical. Let me 
explain why. I think my response on this matter will be un-
usual. 
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SENATOR PRESLEY: It's all in the eyes the beholder. 
You are talking about justice as it pertains to the defendant, 
and not to the victim. 
PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN: No. I'm also thinking about the 
victim in that sense. If you in fact want to do justice to 
the victim in a pure sense you would abolish the jury system 
entirely. That, by the way, has already been proposed in 
one of the local law journals. An article by Professor 
Kessler in Volume V of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 
about a decade ago, suggests the total abolition of the jury 
and that as a stopgap measure, we reduce jury size and also 
reduce the unanimity rule by requiring majority verdicts. 
But, we do that only on the way to a total abolition of the 
jury. It seems to me that my notion of justice is not just 
to the victim, but to the victim as a member of the larger 
society which tries to do justice, and that at some parti-
cular point an individual victim may wind up not receiv-
ing justice, but the procedures to deliver justice will have 
been maintained. In short, what I'm saying is that I think 
the unanimity rule serves a very important purpose for 
justice considerations, in that it protects all of us from 
majority rule. Let me express myself on that point, because 
I think that what I have to say will be surprising to you. 
I favor the unanimity rule precisely because of what you 
might consider its anti-democratic functioning. The jury 
system is in fact the only point in our entire system of 
government where a minority ..... 
CHAIRMAN: I'm sorry. You favor the unanimity rule? 
PROFESSOR SHCEFLIN: Yes, precisely because of what you 
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might consider its anti-democratic characteristics. In the 
legislative forum the majority rules; a minority has no 
ability to protect itself through the exerise of the fran-
chise. In the executive system that's true as well. In 
the judicial system that is similarly true, because judges 
are for the most part either elected by popular vote, ma-
jority will, or selected by individuals who have been al-
ready voted by majority will. It is only in the jury that 
a minority can speak for itself, and therefore, it is only 
in the jury that an individual has the ability to function, 
as Justice White suggested, as an interposition between the 
defendant and the powers of the state. It is the anti-
democratic nature of the jury in that sense -- I put anti-
democratic in quotes -- that protects all of us. Let me 
address that anti-democratic characteristic more closely. 
In our constitutional democracy we do not equate ma-
jority rule with what is just or what is right. Instead we 
want everyone to have a voice in our government, although 
the majority, as we know and expect, will make most decisions. 
But, a jury serves to protect a minority from being trampled 
on by a majority, and it also serves to protect the majority 
from trampling on its own rights. Let me quote to you from 
Chief Justice Story's commentaries on the Constitution. 
It's short, but I think quite elegant. "The great object of 
a trial by jury in criminal cases is to guard against the 
spirit of oppression and tyrannyon the part of rulers, and 
against a spirit of violence and vindictiveness on the part 
of the people. Indeed it is often more important to guard 
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against the latter than the former." I happen to believe that. 
Let me refer to the remarks of the first speaker who said that 
on the basis of a local poll 72% of the people would support 
this amendment. I don't doubt that. What we have is the 
majority deciding that the majority will rule in the only 
part of our government where it doesn't rule. I'm surprised 
the figure is as low as 72% in that regard. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: Passing the state budget is the other 
part. 
PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN: Exactly. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: Of course, this is far more than a 
majority, it's even more than two-thirds, what we are pro-
posing here. 
PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN: The 10-2 or 11-1. Yes, but it's 
reasonable to assume that the 10-2 or 11-1 verdict will stifle 
the minority members who are on the panel. Let me give you 
an illustration. Far more evidence than I need to cite here 
suggests that prosecutors as a matter of routine use the 
power of peremptory challenge to strike minorities from 
juries in many major criminal cases. If the prosecutor can 
be permitted to reduce the potential number of minorities 
who sit on juries, and then the 10-2 or 11-1 can be used to 
stifle the voices of the few who actually do sit on juries, 
we have eliminated the ability of minorities to protect 
themselves in hearings of a judicial nature, and so, we in 
fact do a double disservice to minorities. I don't think it's 
the numbers that are significant. If we dealt only with 
10-2 or 11-1, I would rather deal with the fact that it's 
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only one in 100 cases that at the most would be affected by 
this rule, and it seems to me that that is not too high a 
price to pay for the fact that unanimity suggests to us a 
legitimacy to the jury system as well as the legal system 
that in times of unrest by minorities we can't afford to 
ignore. Remember that in 1968 the Jury Selection and Ser-
vice Act extended the possibility of serving on juries to 
the widest possible number of individuals in the United 
States history. It is precisely after we extended the fran-
chise to serve on juries to as many people as possible that 
we decided we would remove their voice on those jury de-
cisions. I don't think politically that's wise or fair. 
I'm satisfied the majority rule will be the rule in legis-
lative, executive and judicial decisions. I don't see the 
impetus to do so in jury decisions, even despite the fact 
that a jury will occasionally reach the wrong result -- a 
result that maybe that's what happened the four suc-
ceeding trials that we heard about earlier. That is a price 
to pay. There is no such thing as a perfect system of jus-
tice. People will also wind up being acquitted under this 
bill, who would ordinarily perhaps have had another disposi-
tion. I think that because it applies to such few cases 
statistically, and because the jury is the essence of our 
symbol of constitutional democracy, I would rather err on 
the side of the kinds of cases I heard this morning, and feel 
sad about that, than eliminate from the jury system a repre-
senatative sampling of the cross section of the community. 
Yes. 
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CHAIRMAN: I have to cut you off at some point. We 
have a number of other witnesses. I don't know-- has your 
question been responded to -- not p ps the manner you 
would like, but ..... 
SENATOR PRESLEY: Well, it's been responded to, but 
not convincingly. I guess I'm just not convinced. It just 
seems to me that we have a justice system that I suppose is 
supposed to serve everyone, and to make it effective, then, 
they throw all kinds of roadblocks in front of it to 
prevent the police, to begin with, in terms of how they 
search and how they arrest. Then, we've got all kinds of 
roadblocks to the district attorney as to what evidence he 
can present or what he can't present; and then you get the 
jury and you throw some more roadblocks in. And so it just 
seems to me that we have the justice system that's serving 
the defendant very well, but not serving the victim so well. 
That's just a matter of opinion, I guess, there's no answer 
one way or the other. 
CHAIRMAN: Senator Roberti is next and then Senator 
Davis. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: I want to speak about minorities pro-
tecting themselves. I take it that you mean that a jury be-
ing a cross section of the community has to have a repre-
sentation of people who have similar like experiences, hope-
fully, and therefore people on the jury who would be minority 
with any kind of nature. You have a better chance of having 
a shared life experience with the kinds of situations the 
defendant may find himself in that the majority may not have. 
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Is that what you mean, or do you mean some kind of rough 
numbers with minorities and non-minorities being convicted? 
PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN: Well, I think by minority I mean 
anybody who happens to be in a minority in that particular 
case. It could be racial; it could be sex based; it could 
be religious; it could be political; it could be social. I 
think what I'm saying is that we know from a vast amount of 
research on small group deliberations, that a jury that does 
not have to reach unanimity will not listen to all of its 
members; that in fact that once an initial vote is taken and 
that vote is in fact 10 to 2 or 11 to 1, the likelihood of 
continuing deliberations, or deliberations with an open mind 
decreases dramatically. And so, what I'm saying is that the 
majority will not listen to the minority however the minority 
is constituted in that particular case; that the amendment 
will have the effect of exercising majority rule, which in 
most cases perhaps might be permissible, but in the cases 
that are the most important -- the high visibility cases; 
the cases where the defendant really does have an argument 
of being the wrong defendant, or of being a victim of poli-
tical persecution, we will eliminate the opportunity for a 
minority juror to stand on that ground. We know that most 
jurors will favor the prosecution; they will believe cor-
rectly I think, that where there's smoke there's fire, and 
that as a general rule prosecutorial staffs don't bring peo-
ple to trial unless they are in fact guilty. We, of course, 
convict 97% or so, or 96% of the people against whom cri-
minal charges are brought, and so I think the DA system in 
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that regard is working fine. I don't see the imperative to 
take the 4% of cases in which defendants feel they have a 
legitimate grievance against the complaint filed against 
them -- the indictment filed against them -- to take away 
their right to be heard, since their position in being a de-
fendant will be a minority position to start with. Under 
this proposal it seems to me we would have certainly sent 
John Peter Zanger to the gallows, and definitely William Pitt 
as well. And I would think that for the sake of our consti-
tutional liberty we are better off having jurors reach an 
occasional wrong decision by being hung than we are by making 
sure that we obtain more convictions, but not necessarily 
just convictions. 
Let me address very briefly one further point. \~at 
you will do as a result of this amendment, of course, is de-
crease the quality of prosecutorial performance, because it 
will no longer be necessary for the prosecutor to develop 
a case to the point of unanimity, and since the overwhelming 
number of people who serve as jurors will undoubtedly have 
a pro-prosecution bias anyway. In fact the prosecutors will 
not have to convince that minority and will not try to do 
so. You will also encourage the exercise of peremptory 
challenges to in fact get a first vote 10 to 2 or 11 to 1 
verdict, and there probably will be very little in the way 
of deliberations in the jury room. It seems to me that that 
does not contribute to a sense of justice I feel comfortable 
with. 
CHAIID1AN: Senator Davis. 
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SENATOR DAVIS: I want you to answer this question, yes 
or no, if you can. Have you specifically studied Louisiana 
and Oregon before and after the change to a non-unanimous verdict? 
PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN: No, I haven't. 
SENATOR DAVIS: I have no further questions. 
PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN: I wonder if I could address myself 
to the reason why? Just very briefly. 
CHAIRMAN: Can you do so with a couple of sentences? 
SENATOR DAVIS: Another question, yes or no. Have any 
other scholars specifically studied the before and after 
percentage of convictions? Yes or no? 
PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN: I am not aware of any. 
CHAIRMAN: Don't leave yet. Dividing your presenta-
tion into two halves -- your ability to reduce 600 years of 
law and history to ten minutes I think was no less than as-
tounding. 
PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN: I think it was a brilliant performance and 
I tried to absorb as much as I could because I recognized 
that it was coming in a very condensed manner to us. I 
thought it was very useful though, and I give a lot of weight 
to your conclusions. I have some questions about them, but 
I am pleased that you are concerned with the history of the 
thing, with what the law says and, hopefully, with empirical 
data as well as just polls, and your arguments against giving 
too much weight to the poll I think is a useful one in this 
particular context. Let me play the devil's advocate for 
a minute, and I'm not sure it's not my position, so I shouldn't 
call it the devil's advocacy, but why shouldn't society be 
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able to protect itself against the statistical oddball, a guy 
that will not reason; a guy that is in fact the bigot who 
sits on the jury and will not give, whatever tion 
the elements of reason and opportunity to make themselves 
heard in his or her own mind, and stifles the process with 
respect to at least that case, and whatever number of cases 
in which that statistical oddball appears. Now I've dis-
tinguished earlier between the 11 to 1 and the 10 to 2 in 
that respect; that the 10 to 2 has to be far more remote in 
terms of producing the two statistical oddballs on the same 
jury. But why should not society in a 11 to 1 situation be 
able to protect itself against that statistical oddball that 
I refer to? 
PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN: I think that it's not the question 
of why it shouldn't protect itself; I think every rational 
reasonable society would try to protect itself. The ques-
tion is what price does it have to pay to do that. If I 
might, for example, use a hypothetical in a related field, 
we can take dangerous people off the streets, if we could 
predict who would be dangerous. Now, under the best of 
tests -- one that would be 95% effective, we would wind up 
taking hundreds and hundreds of people off the streets erron-
eously. It seems to me that the price here would be, we can 
solve that one case, but at the expense of untold numbers 
of cases in which we would be doing injustice. It seems 
reasonable to believe ..... 
CHAIRMAN: Well, hidden in all that -- and I think 
Senator Presley may be right in this respect -- that hidden in 
all of that is the assumption that you look at the defendant 
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and talk about the relationship of the minority juror not 
just racial minority or ethnic minority, but minority in 
all. .... 
PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN: That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN: ..... different senses to the defendant and 
should not that minority juror be able to assert himself 
against the others? What about the relationship as depicted 
in the earlier cases that were described by Judge Ideman 
where that individual prevents a minority victim from re-
ceiving justice in the sense that the defendant is protected 
by that bigoted act on the part of the minority juror 
and I mean bigoted also in a broad sense. It may not be 
racial; it may be sexual; it may be professional; it may be 
anything. 
PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN: Yes. Well, one of the cases that 
is always proposed in this area is let's take us to the Free-
dom Rider situation down South, and suppose we have a vir-
tually all white jury deciding against white defendants, 
whether or not there are crimes having been committed by 
them. If one or two minority members were able to sit on 
that jury and escape the peremptory challenge, of course, 
those defendants would be acquitted rather than experience 
a hung jury. It seems to me that the argument for fairness 
in justice cuts both ways. There is no way we can guarantee 
that these cases will be decided the way we want. I don't 
see the value of obtaining convictions perhaps as strongly 
as some of you may. I think 95% to 97% of convictions is a 
high enough figure, and that the one or two or three or four 
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cases that we may have to retry to get a conviction, or may 
not be able to obtain a conviction, is a relatively small 
price to pay. But, if you take away a ity ..... 
CHAim1AN: But, isn't the deterrent effect of convic-
tions, doesn't that have to do with public perception, and 
if you asked the public today how many -- if you asked the 
criminal element today how many people get convicted in 
criminal cases, and how many get off, and they'll say, "Hell, 
with a good lawyer I can get off," and large numbers of de-
fendants are going free or criminals are going free with a 
slap on the wrist, and that whole conception that you can 
get out of it somehow. 
PROFESSOR SCHEFLIN: That's right. Well, certainly I 
agree with you that there are various loopholes in the pro-
cedural presentation of cases and in the unconscionable de-
lay in the requirement of a speedy trial, accounts for a 
great deal of error. But, I don't think you can say that 
hung juries fit into that category. They are in numbers of 
cases statistically insignificant, and in those numbers it's 
not accurate to say that juries were hung by biased or corrupt 
individuals. While that's true in some of the cases, it's 
certainly not true in all of them; and perhaps not even true 
in most of them. Part of the difficulty in studying this, 
is that if in fact we did determine that the conviction rate 
would go up, as it inevitably must -- in jurisdictions like 
Louisiana and Oregon -- that wouldn't tell us that they are 
delivering a better system of justice; that would just t2ll us 
that more people are being convicted. It may be that more people are 
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being convicted unfairly. We don't know that. Further, 
the problem of studying actual juries I'm sure is familiar 
to you. Most of our research comes from small group de-
liberations and from mock juries. There are parameters as 
to how closely actual real life juries can be studied. And 
so our data is by necessity drawn from a related field and 
not the actual experience of jury service. If in fact the 
conviction rate, as I said, goes up, it seems to me that is 
not necessarily indicative of a better brand of justice. 
CHAIRMAN: Let me ask if there is anything further by 
the members. Thank you very much. You have certainly added 
a great deal to the hearing. Steve White? Professor Gerald 
Delman. Is that correct? 
PROFESSOR DELMAN: Yes. My name is Gerald Delman and 
I am a Professor of Law at Loyola Law School, and I am de-
lighted to be here. I'm speaking on behalf of California 
Attorneys for Criminal Justice, an organization of approxi-
mately 1700 criminal defense lawyers. What I would like to 
do is present a brief historical overview that touches some 
of the areas of the history of the jury that Professor 
Scheflin did not talk about, and then present to you what I 
believe are 12 good reasons why we should preserve the unan-
imous jury in California. 
Going back to the misty fields of Runnymede in 1215 --
at that time the jury was not actually a fact finder. The 
jury was actually a group of neighbors and witnesses and the 
trial was simply a contest between the victim and the defen-
dant to see who could come up with 12 congregators who would 
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swear to his or her innocence. After the jury's role was 
transformed into that of a fact-finder, in approximately 
the 14th century, unanimity was va d s highly that a 
jury was required to continue deliberating -- i. e. it could 
not be discharged until they reached a unanimous verdict. 
And to speed that process along the jury was kept "without 
food, drink, fire or candle until their verdict was reached." 
So, there literally was no such thing as a hung jury at early 
common law, only a hungry jury. 
These coercive tactics were abandoned in the 18th cen-
tury and we started feeding juries and quenching their thirst, 
and only at that time did the problem of the jury deadlock 
actually arise. One of my favorite early California cases 
involved a defendant who sought a new trial on the ground 
that the jury deliberating his fate on a charge of murder 
had consumed 20 gallons of beer, 2 demijohns of wine, 2 bottles 
of whiskey, as well as other wine and whiskey at each meal, 
including breakfast. The court did grant a new trial in that 
case. 
But quenching the thirst of juries created the deadlock, 
and the deadlock presented a real consitutional dilemma to 
the courts a century ago, because the requirement of unanimity 
conflicted directly with the protection against double jeo-
pardy that a person could not be tried twice for the same 
crime, and the courts opted in favor of preserving the re-
quirement of unanimity and interpreting the double jeopardy 
provision to allow a retrial the jury was unable to reach 
a unanimous verdict. I think that raises a legitimate ques-
tion, whether a valid historical argument could be made that 
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abandoning the requirement of unanimity requires the re-
instatement of the original protection against double jeo-
pardy, to preclude the retrial altogether of a defendant 
if a jury is unable to reach a verdict. 
England abandoned the requirement of unanimity in 1967 
and they do allow 10-2 verdicts in England. But, the cri-
minal. .... 
CHAIRMAN: Excuse me for interrupting, but you are 
raising that as a policy question or as a legal question? 
PROFESSOR DELMAN: Just to give you a historical per-
spective. In terms of what England did? 
CHAIRMAN: No. In terms of whether there is a resur-
rection of the prohibition against double jeopardy ..... 
PROFESSOR DELMAN: Double jeopardy protection. 
CHAIRMAN: ..... by the abandonment of the unanimity rule ..... 
PROFESSOR DELMAN: I'm raising that as a possible con-
stitutional problem that this legislation could raise. I 
think there are several others which I will touch on. 
Under the English Criminal Justice Act of 1967, however, 
the jury is required to deliberate for a minimal period of 
time before they can return a non-unanimous verdict. The 
minimum is two hours and the judge can set a longer period 
in a complex case that he believes requires more delibera-
tions. The commitment to unanimity, however, remains very 
strong in the United States. Only two states have aban-
doned it in felony cases. The first state to do so was 
Louisiana. Louisiana amended its State Constitution in 1898 
to permit 9-3 verdicts in all but capital felonies. Inter-
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estingly in 1898 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that any 
retroactive application of th change would violate the ex 
post facto clause of the Fe 1 Constitution, and that is a 
problem you may want to address with respect to this legisla-
tion, whether it could have any retroactive application. I 
believe it could not without serious constitutional problems 
under the ex post facto clause. 
CHAIRMAN: Senator Presley. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: You say in Louisiana they did that in 1898? 
PROFESSOR DELMAN: 1898. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: Since then they've had 9 to 3 juries? 
PROFESSOR DELMAN: No. While they amended the Constitution 
in 1974 to now require 10 rather than 9, but they have had this 
proposal in effect ..... 
SENATOR PRESLEY: Let me follow up on Senator Davis' ques-
tion. Do you know anybody that's studied that? It's been in 
effect all those years, we ought to know whether or not they're 
turning out a lot of injustice. 
PROFESSOR DELMAN: There have been studies of what effect 
this has on the jury deliberation process, especially in Oregon, 
and I will touch on that in my testimony. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: As far as you know, there have been no 
studies done? 
PROFESSOR DELMAN: I'm not aware of any specific Louisiana 
study that addresses it. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: Someone must have done a Ph.D. disserta-
tion on that. 
CHAIRMAN: You couldn't very well do a before and after 
study, since it happened so long ago. 
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SENATOR PRESLEY: Well, you could do a comparison study. 
CHAIRMAN: Comparison with another state perhaps. 
PROFESSOR DELMAN: The change in Oregon was much more 
recent. Oregon adopted the 10-2 jury verdict in 1934, and ap-
parently that change was inspired by a recommendation made 
by the American Law Institute in 1931. But, significantly, 
both of these states took this position long before the U. S. 
Supreme Court had even held that the constitutional right to 
jury trial under the Federal Constitution applied to the 
states, and when the Supreme Court took that step in 1972, as 
Professor Scheflin indicated in the Johnson and Apodacca de-
cisions, it opened the door to other states to take the sa~e 
step, and I think it's significant that in the intervening 
11 years no other states have taken that step. Louisiana 
and Oregon remain at this point the only two states which 
allow non-unanimous verdicts in felony cases. 
Now I would like to briefly run through what I think 
are 12 good reasons to preserve the requirement of unanimity. 
Some of them have already been touched on by Professor 
Scheflin. 
Reason number one. The requirement of unanimity fur-
thers the essential requirement of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt in criminal cases. I think it's significant that as 
you go back through 600 years of history of the jury the 
unanimity requirement has always been linked to the require-
ment in criminal cases that we prove guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt. In fact the leading historian of the English 
common law, Sir James Fitzjames Stevens, after his historical 
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study of the criminal law of England, found that link so 
strong that he concluded, 'In my opinion, trial by jury has 
both merits and defects, but the unanimity of jurors is 
essential to it. If that is to be given up the institution 
itself should be abolished." In other words, he regarded 
unanimity as such an essential part of the jury deliberative 
process that if we are going to give that up we might as 
well throw the whole thing out. 
CHAIRMAN: Did he ever say why? 
PROFESSOR DELMAN: Because of protecting reasonable 
doubt. His reasoning was we need the protection of reason-
able doubt the most in the closest cases, and in the closest 
cases we are going to have the greatest likelihood that one 
or two jurors are going to have a reasonable doubt, and if 
we ignore that and allow a verdict to be returned we are 
giving up the degree of certainty that we should have before 
we declare someone guilty or innocent of a crime. 
CHAIID1AN: I don't exactly follow that reasoning. How is 
it a close case if it's 11 to 1? 
PROFESSOR DELMAN: Well, you are going to have 11 to 1 
verdicts in the closest cases, and in the closest cases is 
where this concept of reasonable doubt gives the greatest 
proection. 
CHAIRMAN: If you had 5 to 4, or 6 to 3, or 7 to 2, 
how is 11 to 1 close? I don't understand that. 
PROFESSOR DELMAN: It's not close in terms of the 
division of the jury, but it's in that kind of case where 
the evidence is close that allowing that one juror's 
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reasonable doubt to preclude a verdict gives the greatest 
protection. 
CHAIRMAN: OK. My numbers are wrong. I was dealing 
with 9-member juries in my mind. But, I don't see how 
that is considered to be a close case if it's 11 to 1. I 
don't understand that argument. 
PROFESSOR DELMAN: Well, what I'm saying is it's in 
the closest cases that we are going to have the possibility 
of a hung jury present itself. 
CHAIRMAN: Yes. 
PROFESSOR DELMAN: And when that possibility presents 
itself, preserving the value of one juror's doubt of being 
enough to abort the proceedings gives us a greater protection 
to that concept of reasonable doubt, and I think that was 
Stevens' point. 
The second reason I would advance is one that hasn't 
really been talked about, and that is the value of the de-
liberative process itself. I think perhaps the most dra-
matic illustration I could offer is a fictional one. It's 
the presentation in motion pictures and in a Broadway play 
called "Twelve Angry Men" where the jury retires and their 
first vote is 11 to 1 for conviction, and their final vote 
is 12 to 0 for acquital. Now that kind of turnaround doesn't 
happen very frequently in actual cases. In fact the studies 
that have been done of jury behavior suggests that in only 
one out of ten cases does the minority actually turn around 
and convince the majority. But that process is worth pre-
serving, because if we permit the jury to return a verdict 
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as soon as they have 10 votes or 11 votes, that minority view 
may never be listened to. The doubts of a Henry Fonda who is 
hanging up the jury may never be thrashed out in the jury 
room. 
And that leads me to reason number three, and that is 
that the experience in the states which allow non-unanimous 
verdicts confirms that jury deliberation is cut short. Now 
here I'm referring to a survey of all felony jury verdicts 
in Multnomah County,Oregon for a three-year period ending 
in 1983, and that survey revealed that a majority of all 
verdicts returned by juries in t1ultnomah County were not un-
animous. 30% were 10 to 2; 26% were 11 to l; and only 44% 
of their verdicts were unanimous. Now compare that to our 
experience and the experience in other states requiring un-
animity, where only approximately 2-1/2% of the juries hang 
up by a 10 to 2 or 11 to 1 vote. I think that makes it clear 
an abolition of the unanimity requirement removes any moti-
vation that the jurors may have to continue deliberations 
after they achieve the 10 or 11 votes required for conviction 
or acquital. 
My fourth reason is that the requirement of unanimity 
ensures full participation of minorities in the jury pro-
cess. Professor Scheflin touched on this. I think it's 
especially important in California where we value so highly 
the ethnic and cultural diversity of juries that we consti-
tutionally preclude the use of any group bias to strike a 
juror during the peremptory challenges to the jury. 
My fifth reason is that the unanimous verdict is greater 
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public assurance that final justice has been done. I think 
the finality of a jury verdict conveys a symbolic message to 
the community at large. It says to the community that all 
reasonable doubts have been resolved, or in the case of a 
verdict of not guilty, that all of the jurors concluded that 
the prosecution had not overcome the burden of proving of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. And that precludes second guess-
ing, and it unites the jury in a public declaration of their 
decision. They come in, they are polled, they say, "We all 
agree with this verdict," and that says something to the 
community. Since in California a juror is permitted to im-
peach his own verdict, it can be anticipated that abandoning 
this unanimity requirement will increase such challenges, 
using the affidavits of dissenting jurors. Such challenges 
have become commonplace in civil cases in California, and 
I think under this proposal they will become commonplace 
in criminal cases. 
My sixth reason is that the vast majority of states 
adhere to the requirement of unanimity. I've already touched 
on that. It's clear that after 11 years Louisiana and Oregon 
continue to stand alone. The vast majority of the 50 states 
plus the federal system still adhere to the requirement of 
unanimity. 
CHAIRMAN: The federal system is required too, constitutionally! 
PROFESSOR DELMAN: Yes. It is required -- constitu-
tionally required. 
My seventh reason is, I think, kind of the counterpoint to 
what Judge Ideman had to say this morning. Judge Ideman's 
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example, I think we should bear in mind, ultimately resulted 
in the conviction of the culprit. But unanimity is a two-
edged sword. Not only does it protect defendant against 
conviction until 12 jurors are convinced of his guilt, it 
also protects the community against acquital unless 12 jurors 
agree that there is a reasonable doubt as to his gpilt, and 
there is at least one convicted murderer who is now in state 
prison who would be walking the streets of Los Angeles right 
now if this proposal were in effect. 
On August 24, 1980 four citizens were gunned down near 
the intersection of Pico and Robertson in Los Angeles. Three 
of the victims were elderly residents out for an evening 
stroll, and one was a young French tourist visiting Los 
Angeles. At the first trial of the two defendants accused 
of these four murders, the jury hung 11 to 1 for the acquital 
of Perry Jackson. One juror had no reasonable doubt of his 
guilt, and that juror's conscience was vindicated in are-
trial at which Jackson was convicted of those four murders. 
He is now serving a term of 96 years to life in the state 
prison, and if this proposal had been in effect at the time 
that trial took place, he would be walking the streets. 
CHAIRMAN: Senator Presley. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: That is not totally correct, is it? 
Couldn't the district attorney try him again? 
PROFESSOR DELMAN: No. Not if this proposal were in 
effect. The ll to 1 verdict for acquital would have freed 
him. The DA was, of course, free to try him again; did and 
got a conviction under the present requirement of unanimity 
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CHAIRMAN: Isn't that one of the baffling but sad sit-
uations that Professor Scheflin referred to. I mean, how 
does one explain an 11 to 1 in favor of acquittal, followed 
by a 12-0 in favor of guilty? 
PROFESSOR DELMAN: Well, the evidence may be more con-
vincing at the second trial. 
CHAIRMAN: But the probability of that occurring is 
ever so slight, I guess. 
PROFESSOR DELMAN: All I'm saying is the probabilities 
cut both ways. 
CHAIRMAN: It cuts both ways. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: We're talking about the probabili-
ties cutting both ways. That's the first time I ever heard 
of a case like that. That's the first example I've ever 
heard. Do you know of any others? 
PROFESSOR DELHAN: I'm sure I can come up with some. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: That's the first time I've ever heard 
of it cutting that way. 
PROFESSOR DELMAN: I myself as a prosecutor, prosecuted 
a man for a counterfeiting conspiracy and got a 10-2 for 
acquittal the first trial and a conviction at the second 
trial. It does happen. 
CHAIRMAN: I guess it's as improbable as the other case 
where you had four acquittals based on the alleged prejudice 
against the victim. That sounded very improbably to me. 1 
guess it's hard to tell. 
PROFESSOR DELMAN: All right. Reason number 8 that I 
would offer to preserve unanimity, is that allowing 10-2 
verdicts would eliminate only a small portion of jury dead-
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locks. You're going to hear later today from Professor 
Flynn, who conducted a study of all felony jury trials in 
the ten most populous counties of California for a three-
year period, and that study revealed that, while about 12% 
of all jury trials ended in a deadlock, in the vast majority 
of these cases the final split between the jurors was by a 
margin greater than 11 to 1 or 10-2. Over 60% of the hung 
juries involved a final vote of 6-6, 7-5, 8-4 or 9-3. So, 
these deadlocks, of course, would continue, even if this pro-
posal were in effect. 
Reason number nine. I also draw from Professor Flynn's 
study because it showed even as to the deadlocked jury trials 
very few of them necessitated a retrial. Only one-fourth 
of those cases were actually retried. 40% of the cases were 
subsequently dismissed; 34% were resolved by guilty pleas; 
and in the one-fourth that were retried, 18% resulted in 
conviction, and 8% in acquital. I think that suggests that 
we are paying a very small price for the requirement of un-
animity. 
Reasons numbers ten and eleven related specifically to 
what I see as drafting defects in the language of this pro-
posal, because this proposal simply provides that except in 
capital cases the jury's verdict must be by five-sixths of 
the jurors. Now while the provision maintaining the re-
quirement of unanimity for capital cases reflects, I believe, 
a plausible concern for greater certainty ,before we take 
someone's life, unfortunately the corrolary of this pro-
vision is that one who faces execution must bear a heavier 
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burden to gain acquittal, because in a capital case he must 
get a unanimous acquittal. In order to justify that kind 
of classification, I think the state is going to have to 
show a compelling interest, and even if a simple rational 
basis test were applied, there doesn't appear to be any 
reason why the defendant should face a heavier burden to 
gain his acquittal simply because his conviction might end 
his life. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: I'm losing something here. If some-
body faced a burden of gaining his acquittal, if he is ac-
quitted, probably 11 peopl~ very ~ikely, or 10 voted for 
his conviction. So his acquittal would be about one, two or 
three ..... 
PROFESSOR DELMAN: The problem is, Senator, you are say-
ing to a capital defendant, "You cannot be acquitted unless 
all 12 jurors agree that there is a reasonable doubt of your 
guilt." Whereas if he were not a capital defendant, he would 
be acquitted as soon as 10 jurors had a reasonable doubt. 
Even if two thought he should be convicted, and you're deny-
ing that advantage to a defendant, simply because he is charged 
with a capital crime. 
CHAIRMAN: Isn't there a public policy argument that it 
is more serious both for the public at large and for the de-
fendant, and therefore you want a unanimous verdict before 
conviction, or unanimous acquittal before you free the person? 
PROFESSOR DELMAN: I don't think that that public policy 
argument is very weighty. In fact in Oregon they have avoid-
ed this problem. If you look at the Oregon constitutional 
provision, it simply says that unanimity is required for a 
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conviction. 10 out of 12 is OK for any felony case, except 
a capital case, and they say for first degree murder con-
viction you need a unanimous verdict. But, the Oregon Con-
stitution permits an acquittal of first degree murder based 
on 10 out of 12 jurors. So, they've avoided this problem, 
and I think it is a significant constitutional problem in 
terms of equal protection. 
The other problem I see, and this is reason number 11, 
relates to the problem of lesser included offenses. Typi-
cally in a murder case the jury will be instructed that if 
they find an essential element of first degree murder is not 
present, they can then go on to find the defendant guilty of 
second degree murder or manslaughter, which are lesser in-
cluded offenses, if they find all the elements of those of-
fenses. But, under this bill you are saying no verdict can 
be returned except a unanimous one in a capital case. That 
presents the possibility that the jury could unanimously 
agree that there is not a first degree murder; 10 out of 12 
of the jurors could agree that there is manslaughter, or 
second degree murder, and they couldn't return a verdict. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: Well, I understand what we're doing, 
Professor. We are not touching the capital cases at all. 
We are just leaving them alone. 
PROFESSOR DELMAN: Oh, no. No. You are not, because 
you are saying, in the language of this bill, in a criminal 
action other than for an offense punishable by death, five-
sixths of the jury may render a verdict. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: That's what I said, we are setting it 
aside. 
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PROFESSOR DELMAN: But, what you are doing is creating 
an anomaly, because in a non-capital case let's say the 
defendant were charged initially with second degree murder 
or manslaughter -- clearly all we would need would be a 10-2 
verdict, but simply because the case starts out with a pro-
secutorial charge of a capital offense, you change the whole 
equation and you say no verdict can be returned unless it's 
unanimous. I think that creates a significant ..... 
SENATOR PRESLEY: If that is the problem, is it fixable? 
PROFESSOR DELMAN: It's fixable in this bill. Unfor-
tunately it's not fixable in the criminal justice-- the 
Criminal Court Procedure Initiative, because that's beyond 
correcting at this point. It's cast in stone. 
SENATOR ROBERTI: Run this one by me again. 
PROFESSOR DELMAN: OK. What this bill says is, "Other 
than for an offense punishable by death five-sixth of the 
jury may render a verdict." All right. We start with a 
first degree murder charge that is punishable by death. 
The jury agrees -- it is not first degree murder. 10 out 
of 12 of them agree, let's say that it's second degree mur-
der. They can't return a verdict because in this criminal 
action we're dealing with an offense punishable by death. 
The problem was avoided, incidentally, by the Oregon provision, 
by simply saying that for a first degree murder verdict you 
need a unanimous jury. 
Hy final point, and I will close on this note, and 
reason number 12 I think is that the abolition of the require-
ment of the unanimity will create a precedent for further 
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dilution of the right to jury tr 1. The tradition of una-
nimity runs unbroken through 13!+ years of California history, 
and centuries of English and American pract e, and I fear 
that once that tradition is broken we can anticipate fur-
ther efforts to dilute the protection of the right to jury 
trial. Why not 9-3 verdicts; why not reduce the size of the 
jury? In the colorful words of Justice L. Thaxton Hanson 
"The camel's nose is in the tent," and he warns us that the 
red light is flashing against any further tampering with 
California's jury system. "In my vievJ," he states, "any effort 
to reform California's criminal justice process by further 
tampering with the 12-member jury would be extremely unwise 
d d . " an counterpro uct~ve. I very seldom find an opportunity 
to agree with Justice L. Thaxton Hanson, but on this point 
I concur. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN: Any questions of the witness? Thank you very 
much for your testimony. John Steiner. 
MR. STEINER: Good morning. It's a pleasure to be here 
and I'm delighted to testify before the subcommittee. Most 
of the points which I had been intending to make have al-
ready been made by the two Professors who testified before 
me. But, let me run down one or two which I think are par-
ticularly important. 
The idea of a 10-2 jury verdict would, I think, sub-
stantially draw into question the defendant's right to a 
cross section of the community on the jury panel. What often 
happens, for example, if there is a black defendant and one 
black, two blacks on the jury, the peremptory challenges 
-60-
will be used to remove from the jury those people who are 
also black, and I think it could go to any minority, and I 
think it drastically changes the defendant's opportunity to 
get a fair cross section of the community on his panel. 
There is a long history -- everyone has talked about it 
the unanimous jury panel is a basic, essential part of Ameri-
can jurisprudence which I don't think should be ignored. This 
bill is clearly intended to ease the prosecutor's burden of 
proof, and it will do that. It could, and undoubtedly will, 
lead to convictions -- more convictions on less evidence than 
is the case right now, and I think that's the intent of it. 
I think that's something that needs to be looked at very care-
fully, because I think you stand a much greater chance of con-
victing innocent people when you allow a non-unanimous verdict 
of this type. 
I was going to use the Twelve Angry Men analogy, because 
I think that's particularly appropriate. Senator Keene, to 
respond to one of the questions that you posed earlier, do 
you assume automatically that if there's an 11 to 1 division 
that the one person is automatically the oddball? It seems 
to me that there is a substantial possibility that that one 
person may have in fact seen something others didn't see; or 
those two people may have seen something that others didn't 
see. So, unless you define that person as an oddball to be-
gin with, it seems to me then we have to give their views 
some credence. 
CHAI~AN: Just to clarify my position, it is not that 
the one person who is the holdout is in every case an odd-
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ball, hut IT1 ;J ccrt:lin pcrcent:lgC' or tlwse C::ISC'S -- I don't know 
how many -- you're going to have an individual who is to-
tally obstinate or potentially corrupt. /\nd those are the 
cases that people who are on the other side of the issue pur-
port to be concerned about and the cost of reprosecuting 
those cases in such situations. It is possible that all of 
the reason that is available to that jury, the resource of 
reason, is vested in a single individual in an 11 to 1 sit-
uation. But, it is to me unlikely very statistically im-
probable -- that if all the reason is vested in that individudl 
and not in the other jurors, that that individual will have 
been unable to persuade any of his or her colleagues as to 
the innocence or guilt of the individual involved, and you 
know there is always that other case, and there is always 
that sliver of possibility that a particular case will be 
the case in which that probability will arise. But, I think 
it's very slight -- ever so slight. 
MR. STEINER: I understand the point that you are mak-
ing and I don't disagree with you at all. But, it seems to 
me that one of the basic tenets of the American system of 
justice has been that better ten guilty people go free than 
one innocent person be convicted, and I don't think I'm lean-
ing too heavily on the rights of the defendants. This is 
part of the framework of our legal system; it's part of what 
this society is made of, and seems to me that the very 
fact that there are likely to be, or that there may be some 
people in a situation who don't agree makes it very impor-
tant to protect the right in this situation. 
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The one other point that I would make, and I think it 
fits right along with this -- it's been mentioned briefly 
before, but the idea of unanimity, requiring unanimity of 
the group it seems to me can have only the effect of im-
proving the quality of deliberation. If you go back into 
the jury room and there are 9 people who are for either con-
viction or acquittal, then they know all they need to get is 
one more and they can look hard or lean on particularly one 
individual. But, the whole quality of the deliberations, 
the reasoning process, it seems to me would be -- is vastly 
improved when the jury is aware that they must come out with 
a unanimous verdict. And I would say also that the concept 
of jury unanimity does go to support the "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" standard which is another basic part of our jurisprudence. 
I haven't heard the position of the Attorney General 
this morning, but I think it's very significant that the 
Attorney General's office in this situation is taking a posi-
tion opposing this bill. This is a prosecutorial agency run 
by a man who used to be the District Attorney of Los Angeles 
County, and I think it's rare on a bill like this that we 
get the kind of mixed support, or mixed opposition, if you 
will, in this particular situation. 
As a final comment I would just add to the questions 
that have been asked before regarding the studies, or have 
studies been done of other jurisdictions which have had this 
problem. The fact is there are only two in the entire nation 
that allow 10-2 convictions on felonies, and the fact is 
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apparently at least in Californ no real work has been 
done on it to study what has gone on other communities. 
To make such a radical change in our criminal procedure with-
out a very, very detailed sophisticated study of what effects 
this approach has had in other jurisdictions is a very, very 
dangerous, I think, and radical change with our jury procedure. 
CHAIRl~N: OK. Any questions of Mr. Steiner? 
MR. STEINER: Thank you. 
CHAI~N: Thank you very much for being with us. 
Frank Bardsley. 
MR. BARDSLEY: Good morning. I am here as a represen-
tative of the California Public Defenders Association, but 
in that capacity, as Judge Ideman did, I think it would be-
hoove me to give you my background. Since 1969 I have been 
a practicing Deputy Public Defender in the Los Angeles 
office; and in the last two years I have been the Division 
Chief of our Central Superior Court Trials Division. So, 
to this particular discussion this morning I bring a certain 
history and a certain viewpoint on this issue. I don't think 
it would be surprising that I am absolutely against SCA 10 
that we are talking about this morning. I think Professor 
Delman and the other Professors that have testified, and 
will testify today, have covered many of the grounds that 
anyone could come up with, but I think the bottom line that 
this committee and the Legislature must deal with is what 
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kind of society do we want to live in as citizens of the 
State of California. I think it is beyond question that as 
we reduce the requirement from 12 to 0, to 11 to 1, or 10 to 
2, or 9 to 3, that through those cracks will fall innocent 
people who will be convicted. I think the very fact that in 
capital cases that it's required that we maintain unanimity 
is, if not an agreement, at least a concession that that is 
the case, because in capital cases obviously it's too ser-
ious to take that chance. 
Coupled with the fact that the cost that we are dealing 
with here, the proponents I think suggest that we are going 
to save money and that's the reason that we should do this, 
the cost savings and the time savings, I think, balanced 
against where we are going to be as a society is simply not 
worth it. 
The District Attorney this morning led off with some 
statistics ..... 
SENATOR PRESLEY: Where we are as a society at the mom-
ent, we have a lot of dissatisfaction. To a certain extent 
the courts and the criminal justice system has been discredited. 
I think we need to improve on that. And one reason I think 
it has been discredited is that the system seems to be so 
weighted in favor of the defendant and against the victim. 
That's why people are sick and tired of it after a while. 
It's been going on so many years and they, as indicated in 
that poll, think some changes are necessary to fine-tune this 
system. 
HR. BARDSLEY: Senator, I think the passage of this 
type of legislation would in the long run exacerbate the 
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very problem that you are trying to alleviate. When people 
in this state are sent to the state penitentiary for long, 
long periods of time; when members of the jury that con-
victed them are convinced that they are innocent, it is not 
going to make the people as a whole feel that the system has 
the moral force it should. I think this is exactly the wrong 
way to get at the problem that you are trying to alleviate. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: If you recall, the District Attorney's 
testimony this morning, he said most of the people who hold 
out don't do it based on the evidence, maybe they do it on 
some kind of bias, they're dogmatic, or something totally 
aside from the evidence. 
MR. BARDSLEY: Well, I would like to -- I was going to 
address the District Attorney's testimony because there was 
some misstatement, I think, of provable fact there. I will 
start at the beginning with Mr. Philibosian's testimony. 
He said that the Executive Officer of the Los Angeles County 
Superior Courts indicated that 15% of all cases that are 
tried are hung juries. It was published yesterday, I might 
add, in the Daily Journal the Executive Office of the Su-
perio:r- Courts study for the last five years indicates 9%, 
not 15%, are hung juries. The study that Professor Delman 
talked about, that Professor Flynn, I'm sure, will talk to 
you about later today, was a three-year study of the 10 
largest counties in the State of California that tried 81% 
of all the felony jury trials in the state during 1971, '72 
and '73 -- almost 9,000 jury trials -- indicated that of the 
cases that are hung -- now we're talking the 9% that are 
hung -- of that 9%, 75% are never retried, only 25% are re-
-66 
tried. I would submit to you that it's obvious which cases 
are retired and which ones aren't. 40% of the hung juries 
are dismissed. Those are the cases I submit that are 11 to 
1' 10 to 2 and 9 to 3 for acquittal. In 35% the defendant 
pleads guilty, and those, I would submit to you, are the 
cases that are 11 to 1, 10 to 2, 9 to 3 for conviction. The 
25% of the 9%, which comes out to 2% of all the jury trials, 
those are the ones I would submit that are hung 7 to 5, 6 to 
6 and 8 to 4. This legislation will not reach those cases. 
The impact of this legislation is going to be absolutely mini-
mal in the criminal justice system. On average last year the 
best statistics that we can have in Los Angeles County that 
this would result in savings of less than three cases per 
month for the entire County of Los Angeles in retrials. And 
would also ..... 
SENATOR PRESLEY: There might be a difference of opinion 
on these figures. I just don't believe that the District 
Attorney and the Judge that was in here today would be sup-
porting this bill if that was all they get out of the bill, 
what you say. 
MR. BARDSLEY: They get something else out of it, Senator. 
I think that's something we ought to be very honest about. 
Again, the statistics have shown that cases that are hung 
11 to 1 or 10 to 2, whether they be for acquittal or for con-
viction. So, what I think, in answer to Senator Davis' 
question, "Are we getting more convictions through this 
legislation?" The answer is "yes," you will get more con-
victions through this legislation on the first trial. That 
is apparent. All the studies have shown that. The question 
that I think you have to ask yourselves, "Are you saving 
enough money and enough time with that one case out of less 
than a thousand that you are go to save on the retrial to 
do away with something that is as important to the American 
system of criminal justice as the unanimous verdict?" I per-
sonally don't think you are, and I think you are going to see 
if this particular piece of legislat gets on the ballot, 
I think you are going to see that 72% that Mr. Philibosian 
was talking about is nothing like 72% when the electorate 
really understands what we're talking about here. 
CHAIRMAN: Isn't that somewhat conclusionary about "as 
important to the American system of justice as the unanimous 
verdict?" Aren't you deciding the question when you compare 
it in those terms? 
MR. BARDSLEY: I think that's the question that per-
haps you, as Legislators, have to determine. How important 
is that issue? To me, and to the organization which I re-
present, it's extremely important. 
CHAI~~N: OK. And the why for that is that otherwise 
some innocent people will ..... 
HR. BARDSLEY: To me personally that is one of the 
single most important things that I can think of. Our whole 
system of justice is based on what Hr. Steiner has just said, 
that innocent people not be convicted. That, in my opinion, 
is the real reason for the jury and the unanimous jury system. 
It is to make real sure, to the extent that we can, that we do 
not convict innocent people. We are going to convict more 
innocent people with 10 to 2 verdicts or 11 to 1 verdicts than 
we do with unanimous. I think that follows absolutely. 
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CHAIRMAN: What about the argument from the other side 
that says that the prospect of being able to act criminally 
in our society without sanction ever being imposed causes a 
certain number of criminals to do what they do and that there 
will be a certain number of innocent victims that will fall 
prey to those criminals as a consequence of leaving it unani-
mous. 
MR. BARDSLEY: In the last sentence you got past me. 
I would agree totally that criminals should be apprehended 
and they should be convicted and they should be punished. 
That's as important to me as a defense attorney as it is to 
anyone else. I am a citizen of this society like ewerybody 
else. 
CHAIRlUlli: The prospect of eluding that, according to 
proponents of this measure -- the prospects of eluding that 
induce a certain amount of criminal behavior to which inno-
cent people fall victim. Aren't you as concerned about those 
innocent victims as you are about the innocent defendant? 
MR. BARDSLEY: I don't think the premise is correct. 
If you are saying that because a case is hung 11 to 1 or 
10 to 2 for guilty that the criminal goes free, it is simply 
not true. That is not the fact. The fact is that if the 
case is hung 11 to 1 or 10 to 2 for guilty, the overwhelm-
ing percentage of the cases the defendant is going to plead 
guilty at that point. He's seen what happens if he goes 
to trial. The other percentage of the cases, certainly the 
district attorney isn't going to dismiss, he is going tore-
try, and these cases that are retried, the statistics again --
-69-
l ' Ill s u r c P r o I e s s o r F l y n n 1v i I J t e l l you - a r c o v c r w h c l m -
ingly for conviction. So, nobody is going free to be again 
foisting themselves upon e public because it's hung up 11 
to 1 for guilty. 
CHAIRMAN: But, if that percentage is so small, what is 
the prospect of an innocent defendant being convicted under 
an 11 to 1 system? 
MR. BARDSLEY: I think we have obviously not that many. 
But, I can tell you this. I would say almost monthly --
either in the Los Angeles Times, San Francisco Chronicle, 
Sacramento Bee, you can pick up the newspaper and read of 
instances where people have been in prison for long periods 
innocently. It happens all the time, unfortunately. That's 
a price we have to pay in our system, I believe. However, 
you can rest assured you will be reading about that a lot 
more on an 11 to 1, and considerably more again for a 10 to 2, 
and what I'm saying is you have the power to do it. Is it 
worth it? I don't think it is for what you get on the other 
side. You get very, very little. 
CHAIRMAN: Senator Presley. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: You use the phrase "It happens all 
the time. 11 What do you mean by that? 
MR. BARDSLEY: Senator, by that I mean that ..... 
SENATOR PRESLEY: I think it happens quite rarely. 
MR. BARDSLEY: It happens ..... 
SENATOR PRESLEY: It doesn't happen all the time. 
MR. BARDSLEY: Senator, this much I can say. The State 
Public Defenders Office puts out a publication that I re-
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ceive every two weeks. Part of that publication deals with 
doesn't deal with, but it has aspects to it which deal with 
innocent people that have been convicted and it has since 
been found out that they have been released. I get this 
publication twice a month and I would venture to say that at 
least half the time there is such an instance shown. Now, 
these are cases where somebody may have been in custody years 
upon years upon years. They have now been found. All I'm 
saying is that that number will increase. Obviously those 
people that go to jail for 90 days, 120 days, or one or two 
years the chances of any inequities that have occurred there 
being found are very small. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: If we are convicting that many innocent 
people and sending them to prison, that it happens all the 
time, then I am in doubt that would be a very heavy concern 
(inaudible) 
MR. BARDSLEY: It does happen, Senator. I wish -- there 
is obviously no way that we will ever know how often. All 
we can know is those few cases after the fact that are found 
out. The other cases that aren't found out we don't know. 
We know it has happened, we know that we have executed people 
in the United States that have been proven to be innocent 
after the fact. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: Given the limitation on all the screen-
ing that takes place before a person is finally judged guilty, 
it just seems like if that happens all the time we sure have 
a leaky system. 
MR. BARDSLEY: Senator, let me ..... 
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SENATOR PRESLEY: First all, there are inhibitions 
on the police, there are investigation and arrest procedures, 
there are inhibitions there. Then before they can even file 
a complaint, the district attorney has to make a screening. 
Then before the conviction, are restrictions on the 
admissibility of evidence. Then you get to the jury, it has 
to be unanimous and with all of that weighted in favor of the 
defendant, and you say it happens all the time. You are say-
ing that innocent people are being convicted regularly. 
MR. BARDSLEY: I don't want this committee to place a 
percentage on what I meant by that. I don't know what that 
percentage is; I simply don't. I don't think anybody in the 
United States does. 
SENATOR PRESLEY. It's all the time means pretty common. 
MR. BARDSLEY: I think it is happening perhaps, unfor-
tunately it probably is happening -·- it has to, we're human 
beings, we're fallible -- it has to happen. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: You have to admit that's just an as-
sumption on your part. You can't prove ..... 
t1R. BARDSLEY: I cannot prove what percentage that is. 
It's all I can take you back ..... 
SENATOR PRESLEY: ..... that statement that you're making. 
MR. BARDSLEY: I can take you back in literature. I can 
take you back in history and point to instances of it. What 
I'm saying is those instances are going to increase. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: What you are saying today is it happens 
all the time. You augment it by saying that it is an assumption 
on your part. 
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MR. BARDSLEY: Senator, I can prove that it has hap-
pened. I can prove that. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: Not all the time. 
MR. BARDSLEY: What does all the time mean? It's a 
small percentage -- today it is a small percentage of the 
cases -- a very small percentage of the cases. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: What do you mean all the time? 
MR. BARDSLEY: It has happened throughout our history. 
It has happened since I have been ..... 
SENATOR PRESLEY: How frequently? 
CHAIRMAN: Senator Davis. 
SENATOR DAVIS: Do you think it happens very often with 
public defenders doing the defending? I think you guys are 
pretty good. If I was being charged I would much rather have 
a public defender than paid counsel, I think, because I think 
you put your heart into it. You are exceptionally good law-
yers, and you conspire together and get defendants off. You 
analyze the courts and where to go and I find it difficult 
to believe that it would happen very often to someone who was 
represented by a public defender. Now, if he just picks up 
counsel and is short of money or something, it might happen 
more there, but I think in a California Public Defender sys-
tem that happens a lot less frequently than it would in most 
other states. 
MR. BARDSLEY: That may be the case, Senator. I would 
tend to agree with you, and I'm not trying to tell this com-
mittee that is something that happens 10% of the cases, or 
5% of the cases. I don't suspect that it's that high, I 
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don't know. All I am saying to this committee is that it 
does happen, and I think we all know it, and I think we all 
have to agree that if we to 11 to 1 or 10 to 2 it is going 
to happen more often. To what extent we probab will never 
be able to find out, but it is 
That is the point that I'm mak 
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ing to happen more often. 
What we are getting in 
payback from this legislation is so miniscule that I don't 
think if it happens one time more it's worth it, but cer-
tainly not if it happens to the extent that I think that 
it may on a 10 to 2 verdict, or even 11 to 1. 
And in answer to something Senator Presley said earlier, 
in these instances where a jury has voted 11 to 1 to acquit 
and will turn around and vote the next time to convict, Perry 
Jackson was the most recent example that comes to mind --
those cases happen from time to time too, and I think maybe Sena-
tor Davis would be able to second this. I think oftentimes 
when a prosecutor tries the case the second time, his case 
is going to get stronger. He knows where the defense is com-
ing from; he knows what the defense witnesses are going to 
say. Any holes in his case, if it's possible to be patched 
up, have been patched up. That's what happened in Perry 
Jackson; that's what happened in other cases where that hap-
pens. Unfortunately, we are in a certain fiscal crunch. I 
think every Senator on this committee knows that better than 
I do. One of the unfortunate fallouts from that is that our 
prosecutor's offices are staffed probably at a level that is 
below what they should be. When you give a defense attorney 
more cases than he should adequately have, you are going to 
have the chances of an injustice happening. When you give 
a prosecutor less time to prepare and more cases than he 
should have, you are going to have a chance that a case is 
going to be ill prepared and ill presented the first time 
it happens. I think you ought to seriously think about what 
you're going to do in that respect as well. Perry Jackson --
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I happen to know that case. The defense attorney that tried 
it is a close friend of mine, and he is one of the public 
defenders that I sup se. t man has been found 
to be guilty of four counts of first degree murder. He 
would be on the streets today the same neighborhod where 
the jury said he committed those four murders had this legis-
lation been in effect. That's something I think is very 
sobering. 
CHAIRMAN: Let me suggest at this point that in listen-
ing to all of this I am in a great state of doubt that any-
thing is being proved. The proposal is to increase -- the 
proposal would increase the risk to the defendant of con-
viction. The proposal presumably would increase the risk 
to the state of an acquittal. The proponents come in and 
conclude that this proposal is a bene£ to innocent victims, 
that by convicting more people, by moving the process faster, 
by reducing costs, you are going to benefit innocent victims. 
You come in and you argue that it's a detriment to innocent 
defendants. I haven't seen either side prove its case -- I 
haven't heard either side prove its case. I don't know the 
answer to that question. 
MR. BARDSLEY: I think t answer is what you should 
be here about. I think everybody has sa that. Before we 
change 600 years and let 48 of the other 50 states do 
what we have done since the institut of this state, we 
ought to have more data, more empirical information on which 
to base this judgment. 
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CHAIRMAN: You're taking the conservative position, that 
we should not make a change until the case is absolutely 
proven that we should make the change. 
MR. BARDSLEY: Absolutely. On something as ..... 
CHAIRMAN: Because the system that we have now is so 
good, even though it regularly convicts innocent defendants? 
MR. BARDSLEY: I want to get away from regularly con-
victing innocent defendants. 
CHAIRMAN: Occasionally, intermittently ..... 
HR. BARDSLEY: OK. I agree with that. Now that may 
sound to you to be a logic less than compelling. But it's a 
truism that we are all human beings and human beings are 
the ones that make the system work or not work. As long as 
it is peopled by human beings mistakes are going to be made. 
In the United States, I think we have correctly placed a 
high value on personal freedom. Before we change what we 
are doing now and lessen the prospects of somebody, or 
greaten the prospects,thatsomebody would lose their freedom, 
unjustly we ought to have more information than I've seen 
presented to this panel. 
CHAIRMAN: I understand that argument, and it works 
nicely in a courtroom. You are a Legislator sitting here, 
and you say to yourself neither side on the merits has 
proven its case, but the public out there by 72%, or what-
ever, has the perception that the current system is detri-
mental to innocent victims and potential victims in our society. 
They want us to act. Now we exercise our judgment on the 
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merits, we also respond sumably because we are account-
able to the electorate. So, isn't likely that unless 
you came up with an a 0 t ll y we should not 
move in this direction, that islators will respond 
to the political polls and say, "Well, the public perception 
is this, it's a gray area, why shouldn't we go ahead and do 
it and act as representatives?" 
MR. BARDSLEY: I have two answers to that. Number one, 
I think, again -- we're really talking philosophy now, as 
a Legislator you have to answer this yourselves as indivi-
duals, I suppose. As a Legislator do you impose your own 
judgment and knowledge that you get from studying issues, 
listening to testimony, observing the system, or are you 
simply a conduit for the public will in all instances? As 
I said, each of you I think has to answer that question. 
CHAIRMAN: I think in the judgment issue -- when the 
judgment issue is in doubt, isn't the Legislator's responsi-
bility to advance the will of the people? 
MR. BARDSLEY: I think, on the issue that we are talk-
ing about today, to me which is fundamental to our system, 
our scheme of criminal justice in this country, something 
that is so fundamental, I would think before I would go and 
put this to -- as you know I think it's been proven over 
and over again a GallUp poll shows that most of the peo-
ple in the country would g B 1 of Rights if it 
was stated to them. That's something that ..... 
CHAIRMAN: That isn't before us today. 
MR. BARDSLEY: Well, this is very close to one of the 
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issues, isn't it? I think -- parenthetically, I think it 
very interesting -- this was a plurality decision by the 
United States Supreme Court that allows this 10 to 2 verdict. 
One of those Justices 
Supreme Court Justice 
Justice Blackmun, a conservative 
said he thought it necessary to write 
a concurring opinion saying, "I think this is constitutional, 
but I want to make sure that everybody realizes that were I 
sitting on a State Legislature I think this is bad policy, 
and I wouldn't do it." Now I think that's something that, 
again, you should bear in mind. This is Justice Blackmun, 
a conservative Justice of the United States Supreme Court, 
and but for his one vote we wouldn't even be here today, because 
the issue wouldn't be before us. So, it's that fundamental, 
and I think the change so fundamental an aspect of our law 
we ought to have more proof than I've seen. Mr. Philibosian 
says I get these statistics by walking down the hall and 
talking to my attorneys. That's pretty weak evidence I 
think for changing our whole system of justice. 
CHAIRMAN: I appreciate your response. 
MR. BARDSLEY: Thank you. 
CHAIP~~: Thank you very much for being with us. Pro-
fessor Leo J. Flynn. 
PROFESSOR FLYNN: Mr. Chairman, Senators and members 
of the staff. I gather what you want to talk about is my 
research, since apparently that's the major piece of empir-
ical data before you. Under contract to the Office of 
Criminal Justice Planning back in 1974 the same issues were 
before Legislators and Criminal Justice Planners, and the 
question asked was, "What do we know about hung juries and 
can we get any empirical ndlc on the problem?" So, we had 
the same data void t you seem to be facing today, so we 
attempted to find out how many hung juries were and 
what we could find out about them. 
What we did is we had three types of data we used for 
our study.Onc,lvnsinformation reported by the superior courts 
to the Administrative Officer of the California Courts; 
ond piece of data was local superior court information kept; 
and the third was data we had to construct ourselves. First 
of all, at the time we did our study in 1975,most counties 
could not tell you how many hung juries there were. They 
could tell you how many verdict juries there were, and how 
many "other" verdicts there were, of which hung juries were 
a subset. So, we had to go and pull the minute orders for 
each and every case that was on "other" and determine which 
cases were legitimately hung juries and which cases were 
cases ere the defendant died or something happened in the 
meantime. So, we were able to come up with some 1000 trials 
that we identified as hung juries, 900 and some odd of which 
we had useful information on. And this is for three years --
1971, '72 and '73. This was out of a total of nearly 8,200 
some odd cases. We attempted to make some comparisons be-
tween the data we have on hung juries and the verdict juries 
the juries which carne in either to acquit or convict. And 
I can see that you all want to go to , so I'll attempt 
to indicate what we found. 
We attempted to ask some of these questions ..... 
CHAIRMAJl: Quite to the contrary. We can come back after 
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lunch if we need to or we can run over I think without a 
problem. No, we are not -- we are listening to you. 
PROFESSOR FLYNN: Thank you, Senator. What we attempted 
to do. First of all, we attempted to find could we -- from 
the data we had on defendants and on crime types -could we, 
for instance, could we confirm District Attorney Philibosian's 
feeling, or opinion, or conclusion, I don't know where the 
evidence was. But, let's say it's a popular feeling among pro-
secutors, and others, that sexual crimes inordinately are more 
likely to end up in hung juries. Well, we found some slight 
evidence, but when we took all the crimes and disaggregated 
them by property and different types, it wasn't strong enough 
statistically to be able to say, "Ah, this sample, this shows 
that sexual crimes are more likely to end up in hung juries 
than any other kind of property, personal crimes, or other 
crimes." I mean, I'm not saying it didn't exist, I'm just 
saying our data base didn't indicate it. 
Then we attempted to ask the question, "Ah, what about 
race? What about minority status, at least the kind" -- we 
obviously couldn't look at all kinds of minorities, we could 
only look at race and sex, and to some extent criminal back-
ground, and again we couldn't detect anything in our analysis 
of the different variables which would indicate that the de-
fendants in hung jury cases are any different from the verdict 
jury defendants. So, in other words, the system doesn't seem 
to show that any type of crime or type of defendant is singled 
out. 
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Then we attempted to go on with our study and attempt 
to look at the cases, because we couldn't tell anything from 
this, and see how long e C<l took. Yes, all the hung 
jury cases deliberated 1 than the average verdict jury, 
even by crime type. But, that's not surprising, because you 
require unanimity. Normally e judge under California law 
will send the jury back. So, we found, yes, they can consume 
more time, but from that we were unable to conclude anything 
other than they took more time. vJe didn't have any data which 
would tell us, was this the result of an irrational or biased 
juror, or was it the result of a . . . ? consc1ent1ous JUror· Ob-
viously something you would 1 to know, and I would cer-
tainly like to know. And, then as others have said, what we 
found about the disposition is that the average jury in our 
sample was sent back at least twice by the judee· This 
obviously was te d ferent from the sar::-
ple of the 8,000 verd t juries.WP found that only about 10% 
of those cases involved the jury being sent back. We found 
that of the hung jur s, of e 900 and some odd hung juries 
that we had, 40% of those juries -- of those cases -- were 
loter dismissed. Now we don't know why they were dismissed. 
The data simp wasn't there, but this is the kind of infor-
rnation I think a future study would want to have. Were they 
dismissed because witnesses were tired, intimated, memories 
were cold, or were ssed because these are cases in 
which consideration by the prosecutor indicated that they 
were unlikely to subsequently result in a verdict, or at 
least in a probable conviction. We don't know. There is no 
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way we could answer that. We simply know that 40% of these 
cases disappear after the original dismissal of this jury 
before it reached a verdict. 
Of the remaining cases 34% of the defendants pleaded 
guilty. Another 30 some odd I'm sorry. 26%·--of there-
maining cases are acquitted, and the rest are convicted. So, 
a very small number are convicted on a second jury trial, 
though over 60% actually are convicted of some crime -- either 
by pleading guilty because they know what's going to happen, 
or because they are offered a deal, or convicted on second 
retrial. And that's essentially what we were able to find. 
As I said, I think our great finding was to be able to find 
out how many juries there were that hung. We attempted to 
make some estimates on cost, and I certainly would ..... 
CHAIRMAN: Professor Flynn, before you get into costs. 
Were there any statistics on how many hung up on the direction 
of acquittal and how many hung up ..... 
PROFESSOR FLYNN: Yes. I'm sure you are very interested 
in that. I want to refresh myself here. Yes. We found that 
in 62.6% of that whole sample the juries were hung in the 
direction of conviction. In 27.2% in the direction of acquittal, 
and we have breakdown for each pairing. For instance, 15.7% 
were 11 to 1 for conviction; 13.6% 10-2 for conviction. So, 
if you take those together you get over 29%. In other words, 
you would increase by 29% the cases that would result in a 
conviction. On the other hand, for acquittal we have 5.9% 
were 1 to 11 or 11 to 1 for acquittal, and 3.7 were 10-2 
for acquittal, which gives you approximately 10% that would 
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result in an acquittal verdict. And the others would all 
fall below the 1 of cases that would permit either kind 
of a verd t, and under p osal SCA 10 would result 
in automatic di ssal of e c sc. 
CHAIRMAN: So, you went example to 11 to 1 or 
10 to 2 the percentage ..... 
PROFESSOR FLYNN: About 30% ..... 
CHAIRMAN: 30%? 
PROFESSOR FLYNN: ..... more verdicts. 
CHAI Rl-1AN: More verdicts in the direction of conviction? 
PROFESSOR FLYNN: Yes. 30% -- about 30% more convictions 
and 10% more acquittals. the difference in that number 
I gave you -- 40%. 
CHAIRMAN: It would be 30% more convictions and 10% more 
acquittals. I'm looking at data. 
PROFESSOR FLYNN: Yes. I'm sorry-- it's 40%, right. 
So, re would be a total of 40% more verdicts. 
CHAIR!-1AN: 40% more verdicts, three-quarters would 
be in the direction of ..... 
PROFESSOR FLYNN: Three ters would be in the direction 
of conviction. 
CHAIRHAN: I 'w s d. You had a point' 
MR. THOMSON: You're ing about percentage of the 
number of hung juries, not of the total ..... ? 
PROFES FLYNN: No. Not at all. That is a well taken 
question. In other words, t's the percentage of this sample 
of 900 and some o cases that we're talking about. It would 
not be 30% more cr 1 convictions in California. It would 
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still be a very miniscule number overall, if this data is 
still valid today. 
CHAIRMAN: Why don't you continue. I just ..... 
PROFESSOR FLYNN: Well, the only other thing is that 
we attempted to make an estimate of time and cost and this 
estimate is simply based on the best approximation we could 
make at the time. We used data from the Executive Officer 
of the Los Angeles Superior Court, Frank Zolin, at the time, 
who costed out a courtroom time in terms of the judge, the 
jury, the attaches, the bailiffs, the actual physical facili-
ties, in dollars and we looked at time consumed -- actual 
time consumed by our cases as compared to time consumed by 
the average verdict case, and we found that nearly $7 million 
was the cost of all these 900 cases, based on the statistics. 
Now, remember this is the Los Angeles County and we included 
in this 9 other counties where the cost might have been dif-
ferent. The time I think would be different. The 978 hung 
jury trials we studied consumed more than 2,912 days, about 
10% more time than the verdict juries, and that led us to the 
nearly $7 million figure. I wish I had more conclusive infor-
mation to draw from this, but ..... 
CHAIRMAN: Is it then valid to approximate by using a 
40% of that $7 million to conclude that if those juries, under 
a 10-2 system, had not hung you would have saved $3 million? 
PROFESSOR FLYNN: It's valid if you accept this as a valid 
approximation, and I'm sure people would quibble. Some people 
would probably -- say Solano County, which is one of the coun-
ties in our sample -- I believe is one of them -- would probably 
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say the cost isn't ash 
but I think it would g 
get. Now you might, 
, there might be some difference, 
you the best approximation you can 
you assumed is data as valid today, 
I'm sure the Rand Corporation which has done more recent 
studies, might be 
to the mark. 
le to give you a cost figure that's eloser 
CHAIRMAN: OK. I should again underline that we are 
talking about this statistical pool and the $7 million cost 
to approximately try those ..... 
PROFESSOR FLYNN: Right. People wanted to know this ..... 
CHAIID~AN: Richard says t's not correct. 
MR. THOMSON: You wouldn't save $3 million, because that 
amount would have been spent to try the cases ..... 
PROFESSOR FLYNN: Right . 
MR. THOMSON: . . . . . that came from the verdict. The sav-
ings would , a) the cost of the retrials, and I don't know 
if the Professor has the figure for that or not; and 
b) the cost of the additional jury deliberations which I sup-
pose would be significantly less than $3 million. 
PROFESSOR FLYNN: Right. 
CHAIRMAN: You're saying because not each case would be 
retried, the $3 million figure would not apply. 
MR. THOMSON: Right, because that money would have been 
spent in the trial that came to a verdict under the 10-2 
proposal. 
PROFESSOR FLYNN: You are quite accurate. We simply 
looked at those cases and how much they cost, using the time. 
Then we said take a 10% figure of that --we assumed that's the 
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incremental cost for the total trial days we have on the 
first trial, and that would be a saving, and then add to that 
the subsequent trial -- about 60% of cases that are tried 
again, and I can't remember if we have data. This document, 
by the way, you made reference to the article I published in 
Judicature. That came out of data which we generated in an 
empirical study of the frequency of occurrence, causes 
and effects, and amounts of time consumed by hung juries, 
which was done for the Office of Criminal Justice Planning in 
1975, and the data base is still available to you. 
SENATOR DAVIS: Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIR~~N: Senator Davis. 
SENATOR DAVIS: Are you a lawyer, Mr. Flynn? 
PROFESSOR FLYNN: No, I am not. 
SENATOR DAVIS: It was very impressive to hear you stick 
with the facts. I just wish that they would get law pro-
fessors to be able to relate to facts. After all in a cri-
minal trial that's what it is supposed to be about, we get 
such a plethora of emotions and philosophy, cultism and so 
forth, that it's torturous trying to dig the facts out. I 
want to commend you for maintaining your scholarly objecti-
vity. It was very impressive. 
PROFESSOR FLYNN: Well, thank you, Senator. I wish I 
had more information. I'm surprised that having continued 
to follow this research, how little there really is -- I mean 
it's a difficult area to research and understand, and I cer-
tainly hope that your renewed interest will generate attempts 
to get, if nothing else, to get more detailed data, which I am 
sure is very valid. The District Attorney comes here and says, 
_Qh_ 
"Look, I know this happens all the time," and I have no rea-
son to believe that he is wrong. Now we want to know how much 
of the time we would want -- I hope to get to those cases 
early enough so maybe we could learn more about the specifics 
of the case, and maybe if you could convince some district 
attorneys to set up a system to detect hung juries early, 
that the state agency or scholars might be able to develop 
at least more detailed information than I'm aware that exists 
today. 
CHAIRMAN: According to an earlier witness, if I'm para-
phrasing him correctly, there is no need to delay for the 
establishment of further empirical basis for this movement, 
because the polls are so overwhelmingly clear that were that 
data available and were a public education campaign to take 
place, it's doubtful public opinion would shift very much. 
What are your feelings on that? 
PROFESSOR FLYNN: I really don't know if public opinion 
would shift. My only comment is, being conversant with polls, 
I have to be somewhat dubious about the authority of the 
polls at this point. I'm not saying people didn't answer in 
this way, but it's like taking a poll before Prop. 15. If you 
had taken one early you'd find somebody'd come back and say 
70% of the people favor gun control. I'm not saying this 
necessarily came out this way, but, of course, after Prop. 15 
the public completely swung around. My guess is that this is 
the same kind of issue that complexity would lead to change. 
I don't know what direction the change would go. So, I'm not 
against the polls; I don't think they are invalid, but I probably 
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think on an issue as complicated as this they are not very 
directive in and of themselves. 
study. 
CHAIRMAN: Any further questions of Professor Flynn? 
SENATOR PRESLEY: Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN: Senator Presley. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: You referred to the Rand Corporation 
PROFESSOR FLYNN: Well, Rand has done a number of studies. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: Not one on this specific ..... 
PROFESSOR FLYNN: No, sir. But, what they have done, 
both in civil and I think in criminal cases, they've probably 
got the best cost data. They've done a lot of studies both 
for the state, but many more for the federal government, in 
which they have had to gather information. So, when someone 
asks what would seem to be a fairly simple question, "how much 
does a trial cost?" Well, you get on the telephone to Frank 
Zolin, or to the Clerks of any of these municipal courts and 
you will find how unlikely you are to get a fairly straigh-
forward answer to what seems like a simple question. It turns 
out -- when you push it it turns out that the question is more 
complicated than I naively assumed it was when I asked. But, 
Rand, I think, has probably the best data on asking that kind 
of question. 
CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much for being with us this 
morning. Unless there is serious objection on the part of one 
of the witnesses, we are going to break for lunch and come 
back at -- we will resume again at 2:00 o'clock p.m. 
-88-
CHAIID1AN: OK. We will resume with our hearing. Our 
last witness was Professor Flynn and we will now hear from 
Greig Fowler. 
MR. FOWLER: My name is Greig Fowler. I'm President-
elect of the California Trial Lawyers Association. I'll be 
taking office on December 1. This, as I'm sure you all know 
the members of the committee -- is a civil plaintiffs' trial 
Bar composed of approximately 5500 members. We speak strongly, 
very sternly in opposition to anything but a unanimous verdict 
in criminal cases, in this state or anywhere. 
At first blush it might seem that any proposal that 
would lead to increased efficiency in the courts, and to pos-
sibly help the tremendous backlog in civil cases would be 
appealing to us, but, in this particular case justice sacri-
ficed at the altar of efficiency, in this case, is not satis-
factory to us. I have been briefed on what Professor Uelman 
has spoken on this morning, and I am in agreement with his 
proposals and do not intend to rehash them. I would like to 
emphasize something that I personally think is very important 
and should be considered by this committee. The thought of 
having less than a unanimous verdict, taking someone's liberty 
away with only 10 out of 12 agreeing beyond a reasonable doubt, 
or turning the coin over, acquitting somebody who may be guilty 
by this same burden, does not seem proper. It has been our 
experience -- my case, 18 years of practice, almost exclusively 
in civil cases, and in speaking with many others, that jurors 
who may vote in a poll that they would wish to see less than 
a unanimous verdict in a criminal case to promote efficiency, 
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when these jurors are actually put to the task of deliberat-
ing, that's a very important word to consider -- the importance 
of deliberation -- they take this task very seriously, and the 
thought to us, again of having someone incarcerated or ac-
quitted based on only a five-sixths verdict does not seem proper. 
I just want to emphasize that jurors take their job, I would 
say, 99% of the jurors take the task very seriously, and to 
eliminate these inalienable rights based on some sort of a 
five-sixths verdict, or possibly getting the ball rolling to 
something even less than that, is not acceptable and is not con-
sistent with the justice system in this country, the greatest 
justice system in the world, that the world has ever known, 
that this country has built up. Societies and countries are 
judged by how they treat their accused, and I think that any 
dilution in the finest jury system, the finest system of jus-
tice ever created by man would not be acceptable and would 
not be proper and right. So, I would ask -- we just register 
our very strict opposition to this proposal. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN: Can you respond to a couple of questions? 
Senator -- is that Senator Davis? Senator Davis. 
SENATOR DAVIS: Are non-unanimous jury verdicts allowed 
in civil cases? 
MR. FOWLER: Yes, and that would be 9 out of 12, and that 
has been in effect for some considerable period of time, and 
my response to that, we are dealing with the type of cases I 
handle, amounts of money or transfers of property, or what-
ever, and that's the way the system has been. When you talk 
about personal liberty, you know, incarceration ..... 
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SENATOR DAVIS: My next question about the non-unanimous 
civil verdict, what was the position of your Association at 
the time that legislation was pending? 
MR. FOWLER: I don't believe that our Association was 
in existence when that was put in effect, because we have 
been in existence since 1962 and it is my belief that the 
non-unanimous jury long preceded that, sir. 
SENATOR DAVIS: Do you think the civil defense Bar, if 
they had the option, would go back to unanimous verdict away 
from the 9-3? 
MR. FOWLER: I can't answer that, because it has not 
been proposed. I think we are just dealing with apples and 
oranges, Senator, when we are talking about this type of 
thing. It could be that what is proposed here is more effi-
cient, but I think in one case you are dealing with apples 
and the other thing with oranges, and that's why it's ..... 
SENATOR DAVIS: As the plaintiff's lawyer you like the 
9-3? 
MR. FOWLER: The 9-3 is acceptable. I would have no 
problem with the unanimous verdict system in civil cases. 
SENATOR DAVIS: You don't think it would have made any 
difference in whether or not you win a case? 
MR. FOWLER: I think the system might be a little more 
efficient in certain cases, but I think -- really when you 
get down to a jury talking about amounts of money, and so 
forth, they can basically come to an agreement. When you are 
talking again about a person's liberty I think it's a differ-
ent thing entirely. 
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SENATOR DAVIS: Well, isn't talking about their livelihood 
and their property, and so forth, also an extremely important 
thing? 
MR. FOWLER: It certainly is. There is no question 
about that. But, I have heard no great opposition to the 
system as we have it now from our members going through the 
years. So, that's something I've not considered ..... 
SENATOR DAVIS: There is all kinds of criticism, espec-
ially from the defense Bar, that thinks that what's happened 
in the courts in terms of justice for the defense has been 
terrible, and your Association slams down ana kills any kind 
of decent product liability reform, and you like it, you want 
it your own way, and you get it that way. I want to commend 
you for the effective ..... 
MR. FOWLER: Well, Senator, what we want is safer pro-
ducts and less people injured-- that's what we want. It may 
put us out of business, but -- and we think the most effective 
way to -- one of the most effective ways to do that besides 
legislation is to let the manufacturers know that if they 
put a defective product on the market that injures somebody, 
they are going to have to pay for that. If they don't put a 
defective product on the market they have nothing to worry 
about. 
SENATOR DAVIS: Would you support legislation for an in-
nocent warehouseman or wholesaler who doesn't tamper with 
anything, and doesn't know anything about it, to protect him 
from being dragged in by trial lawyers and those people having to 
put up sums of money for five and six and seven years to defend 
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themselves and then they are exonerated? 
MR. FOWLER: Well, Senator Davis, I personally wouldn't 
do that, because that would go against the entire philosophy 
of the Products Liability Law as it has been developed by 
the courts over many years the Henningsen case back in 
1910; the Greenman case in 1962 to more subsequent cases. 
What we have gotten from that are safer products. 
SENATOR DAVIS: But, you have a lot of innocent people 
warehousemen, wholesalers who are harmed in the process. I 
hope to see the same compassion for them that you have for 
the criminal defendant, when you take over on December 1. 
1:-lR. FOWLER: And I might add that we do have unanimous 
verdicts in civil cases in federal courts, and we live with 
that and we don't complain about that. Thank you. 
CHAI&~: Senator Presley. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: You said we have the finest justice 
system in the world I don't know if that's true, but I hope 
it is. I guess the ansHer we always have had after \!Ve make 
that statement is "Justice for whom?" And would you say that 
the present system is skewed in favor of the defendant over 
the victim? 
MR. FOWLER: No, I don't think so. If we are staying 
within the parameters of the legislation, the amendment that 
is proposed, no, not at all. You are simply asking 12 peers 
to listen to all the evidence, to reasonably deliberate, and 
to come to a decision, and as you know, the amendment as 
proposed by you, sir, would cut both ways. As I say, there 
would be acquittals when there might not should be. 
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If we don't have this full deliberative process -- oh, sure 
there are efficient ways of doing things. I mean they have 
very efficient ways in Russia ..... 
SENATOR PRESLEY: I don't question that statement. You're 
talking in terms of dollars, but this probably would be the 
more efficient way (inaudible) We are concerned whether or 
not real justice is being done for the victims versus the de-
fendants. We had a discussion this morning about all the re-
straints that are placed on the process of the system, the 
investigative procedures, the introduction of evidence, juries, 
all those things seem to make it very, very tough to convict 
the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. But, it seems that 
we get to the point where the victim·has lost out there, and 
they are raped and they are murdered, they are burglarized, 
and they are robbed, and they have to suffer from that, and 
they'll probably suffer, at least psychologically, for the 
rest of their lives, and this person in many cases gets off 
and goes on about his business. 
MR. FOWLER: I agree with all of these things. I know 
there is a hue and cry about these things, and we are all 
very sympathetic with the victim. But, again, when we get 
down to the point of the accused and what should be done when 
the accused is tried, and it just sticks in my craw, this 
idea that this person will either be acquitted or convicted 
when there are two -- and I like to consider all jurors reason-
able people some may not be, but we have to when we ap-
proach this bill consider it that way -- that two reasonable 
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people or one reasonable person listens to all the evidence 
and does not agree, that person should either be acquitted 
or convicted. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: Maybe those people have reasons other 
than the evidence. 
MR. FOWLER: They might. He can never know. We can 
never know what has gone through the minds of all the jurors 
in all the cases we've even tried or heard of. We can never 
know that. We can only come up with what we consider to be 
the best system, which I think we have now in terms of trying 
criminal defendants, and if there were a better system in 
another society, another country, certainly someone would 
have come ahead with it. But, as far as lessening that bur-
den to either convict or acquit, that's not the answer. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: There were two states that have ..... 
MR. FOVJLER: I heard that. Louisiana and Oregon. I 
heard that. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: Are you familiar with what their re-
sults have been? 
MR. FOWLER: No, I'm not. I'm sure that there has been 
a greater efficiency; I'm not sure there have probably been less 
hung juries and less retrials, and I'll concede that ..... 
SENATOR PRESLEY: If we had, in those two states, and 
I'm not sure either, but, it seems to me if in those two 
states they found themselves doing a lot of injustice to the 
defendants, that they would change back. Louisiana, for ex-
ample, they testified this morning have done this since 1898; 
and Oregon, I think, since 1934. So, if it's so bad that you 
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run the risk of thwarting a good criminal jus system, you 
think they would change back. 
MR. FOWLER: Well, things are rarely changed back once 
they are put in. I cannot speak for the experience in Oregon. 
I know that in Louisiana the system started out when Louisiana 
was originally a territory of France. The defendant was pre-
sumed guilty until proved innocent. They still use the French 
civil law which is the French burden. At least they've come 
far enough where the burden is put on the prosecution. It 
may not be unanimous, but they did show some progress cer-
tainly since the time of the Louisiana Purchase. 
SENATOR DAVIS: You disagree with Napoleonic justice then? 
MR. FOWLER: Yes, I do. I like their wine; I don't 
like their justice. 
CHAIRMAN: We have a poll that was presented to us. The 
question was asked, Proposition 1 allows conviction on a jury 
vote of 11 to 1 or 10 to 2. The death penalty is not involved 
in those cases. The vote was more than 3 to 1 in favor of 
that particular proposition. So, I have a group of consti-
tuents who come up to me and say, "3 to 1, and more than 3 to 
1 we favor going to an 11 to 1 or 10 to 2 jury." And I re-
spond, "Well, that's not a good idea because ..... " And they 
want to hear an answer in 25 words or less. How would you 
complete that sentence? 
MR. FOWLER: Well, I would just -- I alluded to that by 
simply saying that those that would answer a poll are in a 
frame of mind where they are concerned about law and order 
we all are -- they are in a frame of mind, but they should be 
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in a different frame of mind if they were sitting on a jury, 
or if they or one of their loved ones was accused of a crime. 
And again it gets back to the fact that it's just unaccept-
able to take someone's liberty away without unanimity. 
Answering a poll and sitting on a jury are two different things. 
CHAIID-1AN: But, concluding that it'· s unacceptable doesn't 
provide the why? If I tell them now that it's not a good idea, 
they are going to say, "Well, why not?" Well, I'm going to 
say, "Hell, because it's unacceptable." What do I tell them? 
MR. FOWLER: Well, you can go on about the foundation of 
our traditions for justice and due process. You can tell 
them that the system that we have developed in this country 
provides a safeguard by this unanimity that an innocent per-
son is not going to be convicted unless 12 of his or her peers 
agree upon it to a standard which we call "a reasonable doubt 
to a moral certainty," and that is an important safe~uard to 
have in our society. You may not, as an elected official, 
want to say this. It may result in certain cases, and it un-
doubtedly has, in certain guilty people going free. But, the 
important thing about our country and about how it was founded, 
and how it has progressed, is that the innocent person is 
not put away, is not put to death, or incarcerated, as so 
many innocent people have been in totalitarian societies. 
CHAIID1AN: But, when guilty people go free, aren't in-
nocent people placed at risk? 
HR. FOWLER: There's no question about it. 
CHAIID-1AN: So, which innocent individual ..... 
MR. FOWLER: We can't assure this by having less -- that 
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it's going to be better by having less than a unanimous ver-
dict, because you can certainly make an argument that guilty 
people are more likely -- could be more likely to go free 
if you don't have this unanimity on the jury. You just keep 
on turning that coin back and forth, and it works both ways. 
I'm not saying that we should have 20 people on the jury, or 
6 as we have in federal courts, but in the process -- and I'm 
just going by the assumptions. I believe in this very truly, 
having talked to jurors -- you spend a lot of time when you 
lose a case talking to jurors, I think more than when you 
win one, about how they felt, and they just take this task 
so seriously. I think we can ask for nothing better than to 
have 12 people taking that task seriously, and talking among 
themselves, all twelve of them, and coming to a unanimous 
verdict. 
Block. 
CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Sheriff Block. Sheriff Sherman 
SENATOR PRESLEY: Mr. Chairman, just a little commentary. 
CHAIID1AN: Senator Presley. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: We hear the same thing all the time, 
that it's in the interest of the accused, safeguards, and 
tradition and all that seems to indicate that if they rode 
heavy on the side of the defendant rather than the victim, 
and the only thing historically and traditionally, meaning, 
I suppose that because it built itself up over the years, 
it's perfect, it can't be improved upon. Just a commentary. 
CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Sheriff Block. 
SHERIFF BLOCK: Thank you. Mr. Chairman, members of 
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this committee, I'm here to express my support for SCA 10 and 
for the concept of less than unanimous juries in all but capi-
tal cases. This particular provision is an integral part of 
the initiative that is currently in circulation gathering 
signatures, in which I have played an integral part in de-
velopment and the support of that effort. And the reason for 
my support of this proposal and certain others, is that in 
the 28 years that I have been in law enforcement as a member 
of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, I have seen 
many changes take place in the administration of criminal 
justice, in the conduct of carrying out the public safety 
responsibility, and among all of these changes I think the 
most significant has been the ever growing complexity of the 
criminal trial process. There has been what I perceive as 
a movement away from a search for the -- a legitimate search 
for the truth toward a search for technical imperfection. I 
believe that our current jury system enhances that search 
for technical imperfection. We have a system wherein we 
select 12 persons from the community, persons who are of 
average intelligence -- at least we expect the juror to at 
least be of average intelligence persons who are subjected 
to large amounts of testimony, some of a very technical, 
highly emotional nature . They view exhibits which likewise 
are of a highly technical nature at times. We then require 
these people to adjourn to a jury room to deliberate and to 
come to a single mind before we have a verdict. Then the 
same matter proceeds up through the appellate system, and at 
each of the court levels, be it the Appellate Court or the 
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Supreme Court, where we have very learned people, all we re-
quire is a majority of one in order to render the final 
decision. 
What I have seen happening with the trial process, parti-
cularly with the jury process, in the criminal courts of this 
state, has been what I can only refer to as a perversion of 
the original intent of the system. I'm talking about this 
growth of the new profession, if you will, of jury consul-
tants -- individuals who go out and conduct interviews in 
communities; individuals who monitor trials in progress; who 
develop computer programs, establishing profiles of indivi-
duals who voted foraquittal or conviction in a particular 
type of case, or a particular charge was alleged, and then to 
assist the attorneys in trying to select the jury as close 
to the profile that has been established as possible to try 
and benefit the person charged with the crime. Recognizing 
that even one such person on the jury, which may result in a 
less than unanimous verdict, could cause the process to be 
declared a mistrial and to start all over again. 
Now, I've heard it referred to in this hearing, and 
certainly in other debates on the issue that I have partici-
pated in, that this is the kind of process that takes place 
in totalitarian countries. The President of one of the Bar 
Associations said that in Communist Russia they have speedy 
trials. I, first of all, resent the inference of any com-
parison between what is being advocated here and what goes 
on in the totalitarian countries. The State of 
Oregon, which you referred to, by any standard may be the 
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most liberal state in the United States in dealing with indi-
vidual rights and the administration of our criminal justice 
system. 'f'hc y have found that their less than unanimous 
jury verdict -- 10-2, 11 to 1 -- works very well for that 
state. There have been many articles written by the appellate 
justices of that state commenting on the validity of that pro-
cess. I might also submit that in this county, based upon 
my own experience, where there have been verdicts of 10-2 or 
11 to 1 for conviction, that probably in virtually 100% of 
the cases, there has either been a retrial for the finding of 
guilt or a plea of guilty to the charge and where there is 
a 10-2 or 11-1 split verdict for acquittal there has probably 
not been a refiling of the charges. So, I believe that, 
while this less than unanimous verdict will in fact eliminate 
the requirement for new trials in a number of instances, it 
will not in any way affect what is the current administration 
of criminal justice, either in this community or in this state. 
CHAIRMAN: Any questions of the Sheriff? If the purpose 
is to weed out the juror who is unresponsive to the evidence; 
an obstinate juror; a juror who isn't capable of understand-
ing the evidence; a juror who perhaps is corrupt in some 
fashion, I take it that that is a sufficiently rare circum-
stance that the likelihood of having two on the same jury is 
quite small, and if so why do we have to move to a 10 to 2? 
Why wouldn't an 11 to 1 suffice to weed out that occasional 
juror that cannot play a part in the system? 
SHERIFF BLOCK: Because we have a track record that has 
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this proposal that it was being advocated as such a dramatic 
break with tradition. Yet, it's interesting when decisions 
have come down from the United States Supreme Court that have 
had a dramatic impact on our ability to provide for the public 
safety of this community, decisions which have had dramatic 
breaks with tradition, I have not heard the hue and cry about 
forget what the U. S. Supreme Court said or forget about tradi-
tion Let's go with what the Supreme Court has indicated, and 
that's what we're doing here. I believe that the right to 
trial by jury of peers is being met; I believe that five-sixths 
constitutes a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt; I believe the 
moral certainty aspect is being met; and obviously the United 
States Supreme Court believes the same thing, and who am I to 
quarrel with the United States Supreme Court on a matter if it's 
of constitutional importance. 
CHAIRMAN: You mean you've never questioned the wisdom 
of the Supreme Court decisions? 
SHERIFF BLOCK: I certainly have, but the point that I'm 
making is that you can't have it both ways. We have 
been told that we do not enjoy the luxury -- or should not 
enjoy the luxury-as law enforcement of enforcing the law or 
doing our job based upon those laws that we agree with, or 
those decisions that we agree with I submit to the op-
ponents of this proposal that they play by those same rules 
and not take positions based upon what I have to believe. 
I guess one point I have to make I don't know if it's fair 
and proper -- but we should look at the proponents and the 






























initiative, and the part that we talked about and referred 
to was the success of the Oregon experience and quoted from 
a number of papers that had been developed by appellate 
court justices with that state. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: Was the initiative endorsed by the 
Criminal Justice group-- the one that was formed ..... ? 
SHERIFF BLOCK: That group, the one you are referring to, 
does not take a stand on ballot propositions, and so forth, 
but the Countywide Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, 
which is made up of myself; Chief of Police of Los Angeles; 
a representative of local small town chiefs of police; Dis-
trict Attorney; Public Defender; City Attorney; Mayor of Los 
Angeles; somebody representing the other Mayors; presiding 
Judges of the Courts -- some 20 members. When the proposal 
was put before the committee for a vote to go forward or not 
to go forward, there was only one vote in opposition. The 
Public Defender voted in opposition; all other members of 
the Countywide Committee voted in favor of the proposal. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: Is that the PJ of the Superior Court? 
SHERIFF BLOCK: The PJ of the Superior Court, Munici-
pal Court of both Los Angeles and President of the Presiding 
Judges Association for Los Angeles County. 
CHAI&~N: Does the fact that we are talking about a 
very small number of cases have any impact on your thinking 
on this issue? We went through some statistics earlier be-
fore you arrived that indicate that we are talking about a 
couple of cases at the most out of 100 that would be affected 
by this. 
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charge. So, I believe it's a problem that will grow in 
frequency, and will work against wh~.t I believe is a legi-
timate search for the truth. 
CHAIRMAN: And you don't believe 10-2 is overkill? 
SHERIFF BLOCK: I do not believe that 10-2 is overkill, 
and I might add -- while it is not part of SCA 10, we also 
have in the initiative a provision that if there are 7 votes 
for acquital, that unless there Gan be a showing by the peo-
ple that there is evidence available that was not available 
in the original trial, that would be a bar to prosecution. 
So, the proposal is designed to, once again, to be fair, 
proper administration of criminal justice, recognizing both 
the legitimate rights of the accused, but at the same time 
recognizing the legitimate rights of the rest of society, 
which, among other things, haq to pay the bill for what 
goes on. In Los Angeles County the cost is somewhere between 
$4500 and $5000 a day to administer a single Superior Court. 
CHAIR}~: Again, you don't believe that 10-2 is over-
kill? 
SHERIFF BLOCK: I do not. 
CHAIRMAN: The reason for that is that it works in 
Oregon? 
SHERIFF BLOCK: It works in Oregon. It is my under-
standing that it works in ..... 
CHAIRMAN: Could it be overkill in Oregon? 
SHERIFF BLOCK: I don't believe so. I do not believe 
it's overkill. 
CHAIRMAN: I understand that, but why? 
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similar cases throughout the country. There have been other 
cases where they go out, hire a jury consultant and prior 
to the trial the consultant will go out and conduct inter-
views on the street -- perhaps hundreds of people -- getting 
background information on them -- their age; their occupa-
tion; their income level; whatever, and then say, "If you 
were made aware that a male adult, 35 years old, had sex with 
a 17-year old girl, and she consented, although that may be a 
technical violation of the law -- if you were sitting on this 
jury would you find this person guilty of statutory rape; 
would you find them guilty, and then if you learned that this 
17-year old female had a record of sexual promiscuity ..... " 
They develop all this information, computerize it, and they 
then look at the list and decide that, you know, a male white, 
42 years old, and a certain range of occupation, or economic 
level, may be the best person to have on this jury for our 
side. If that is selecting a jury of peers, and if that's 
what was designed by the framers of our criminal court sys-
tem, then I've missed something in my 28 years, I'll tell 
you that. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: Was this -- in the case that you 
mentioned -- was this person paid by taxpayer funds? 
SHERIFF BLOCK: Would have to be, because it was a 
court-appointed attorney. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: Mr. Chairman, is that an extension of 
voir dire, a rather long extension of what has been described 
here? 
MR. THOMSON: I think the way to get at it would be 
to limit voir dire. 
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MR. TALCOTT: Good afternoon Senator and members of the 
committee. I am Robert Talcott. I'm appearing here this 
afternoon as a representat of the Los Angeles County Bar 
Association. I might say at the outset, Senators, that the 
consideration of SCA 10 was given exhaustive and thorough 
consideration by the Trustees before they entered their vote 
on whether to support or oppose it. There were meetings 
in which the District Attorney from Los Angeles County was 
invited, judges from the Superior Court were invited, argu-
ing in favor of the Constitutional Amendment. There were 
parties brought in that were setting forth arguments against 
it. These meetings with the debate went on and lasted over 
several days; they occurred at open meetings of local Bar 
leaders; and after consideration and questioning, the di-
gesting of all of the arguments pro, and all of the argu-
ments con with respect to Senator Presley's Constitutional 
Amendment, the unanimous conclusion of the Trustees of the 
local Bar Association-- which represents 17,000 lawyers, 
which isn't even all the lawyers here in Los Angeles -- about 
60% of the lawyers --but, representing those 17,000 law-
yers, they met and unanimously concluded that they would 
oppose SCA 10; that they were not convinced; they were not 
impressed by the arguments. 
CHAIRMAN: Senator Presley. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: How many people were voting on this 
decision? 
MR. TALCOTT: There were approximately 36 Trustees ..... 









































MR. TALCOTT: That's correct. It was a unanimous vote 
in opposition. Now, while the question put to other people 
testifying here today were illuminating, nobody is against 
protecting victims; nobody is against a more efficient sys-
tem when we talk about the administration of justice. The 
consensus was that this did not promote a fair administra-
tion of justice. Senator Keene said, 11Fill in the f.ast line," 
to one of the other witnesses. "\\!hat am I going to tell my 
constituents, if they say to me, 'well why isn't it a good 
idea?'" And I don't know that this will explain it, but 
let me attempt to try to capsulize what some of the feeling 
was among the people that I represent in the LA County Bar 
Association. 
They said, you know what this does? If you allow 10 
people to make the judgment, then we could envision a situa-
tion where the jury has listened to the evidence; they are 
instructed by the judge; they retire to the jury room; and then 
they say they select a foreman as is the usual procedure, and 
the foreman says, "Let's take a straw vote right now and see 
where we stand. Let's see how far we have to go one way or 
the other." And everybody writes down on a piece of paper, 
it's handed to the foreman, and the foreman unrolls each 
piece of paper and tabulates the total. And you know what 
he comes up with? 10 for acquittal, or 10 for conviction, 
and 2 taking the opposite side, whatever it might be in that 
particular case. He said, "That wraps it up ladies and 
gentlemen. You've done a hell of a job; let's move on; we 
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if you are convinced that view or opinion was erroneous." 
Then the judge goes on to tell the jury, "But don't do so 
don't surrender your honest conviction as to the weight of 
the evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow 
jurors or for the mere purpose of reaching a verdict." 
What that does, it distills what we're talking abo~t. It 
says -- you know what's unique about our jury system? It 
compells a discussion, and it's not a race for justice. I 
think if the Bar Association had to capsulize, Senator 
Presley, for you or for Senator Keene to take back to his 
constituents, or to Senator Davis, what we are concerned 
about is the 10-2 verdict has the potential of undermining 
the necessity and the responsibility to deliberate together 
in and amongst themselves. 
SENATOR DAVIS: I have a question. 
CHAIPJMAN: Senator Davis and then Senator Presley. 
SENATOR DAVIS: Have you, Mr. Talcott, heard any criticiam 
from the Bar in Oregon that when they went to 10-2 that 
tended to cause the jury to disregard the opinions of one 
or two jurors? Have there been any studies to determine that? 
Has there been any real objective analysis by any reseachers 
to show whether or not that has happened? I told the Chair-
man it's too bad we are not holding this hearing in Portland, 
because I haven't heard any real objective factors here, 
advocacy on both sides, most of the Bar being absolutely 
negative. You fellows remind me of Chiefs of Police of 20 
years ago, when people pointed and said, "You fellows cause 
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and conducted a poll or a survey in Oregon. I would sug-
gest that these hearings certainly are going to promote the 
probability of a study being done, so that if there is fur-
ther discord that that would -- since you and others have 
expressed an interest in how that experiment of long-standing 
has been going, I would suggest that that will probably be 
done at some time. I do not have that information. But, I 
would like to answer you this way I would like to answer 
you this way. I would suggest ..... 
SENATOR DAVIS: I heard a tape just quit, and I didn't 
want to lose any of your words of wisdom. 
MR. TALCOTT: I think that there exists in the United 
States good justice, better justice, and the best justice, 
and it might vary within the criminal justice system, the 
administration of justice within the states. I would sug-
gest to you that, although there may not be hues and cries 
of dissent in Oregon and Louisiana, that that may not be the 
best justice, and that's what all of us here today are really 
seeking for and pursuing. California is really a terrific 
and unique state, because we have always striven for the 
best in everything -- not just good. Maybe that system works 
in Louisiana; maybe it works in Oregon, and nobody is scream-
ing and yelling to change it. 
CHAIRMAN: I am going to ask that you keep your remarks 
a little bit briefer. If you can condense them just a little 
bit. 
HR. TALCOTT: I'm sorry. 
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am sure there are others. 
MR. TALCOTT: I'm sure there are, and for the Bar Assoc-
iaton what has occurred is t the evidence presented to 
require the change has not been compelling or convincing. 
One of the arguments that has been probably rehashed here 
many times, is that it's economically sound to do that. The 
Bar Association was not convinced that that is a substantially 
significant reason to change it because it saves money. Now, 
that may be a consideration for you, and properly so, but for 
people involved in the justice system they don't feel that a 
dollar sign should be the determination of whether or not 
certain activities should occur or should not occur. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: Most of these other people that we 
are talking about are proponents, are part of the justice 
system, so you can't say you're involved in the justice system. 
You're all-encompassing like that, including everyone. You're ..... 
MR. TALCOTT: I mean in the group that I'm representing, 
they were not impressed by the monetary ..... 
SENATOR PRESLEY: Are all your members defense-minded 
attorneys? 
MR. TALCOTT: Not at all. The Los Angeles County Bar 
Association is a voluntary Bar and there is no mandatory re-
quirement; it is not made up of defense lawyers, or plaintiffs' 
lawyers. It's made up of lawyers who are interested in the 
administration of justice in this community, and that covers 
everything -- civil, and what have you. So, the argument 
about the dollar sign was not compelling. What seems to be 
the unstated agenda as the purpose of this was that they wanted 
greater insurance of conviction, rather than having the recal-
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SENATOR PRESLEY: I you are not to the 
they were proponents, c I 
doing just on economic grounds. 
MR. TALCOTT: 
SENATOR 
and you seem to be 











there is a lot 
scribed here 
can imagine 
every kind of emotion, I guess, that you could imagine, that 
the victim had to go through, and all of that. And after 
four trials never saw just e done. So, that's another major 
part of this -- it's not just economic. 
CHAIRMAN: Anything further? Thank you. I appreciate 
your testimony. I understand we have someone from the Los 
Angeles County Chamber. I don't have your name on ..... 
HR. LESAGE: I'm Bernard LeSage, Vice Chair of the 
Law and Justice Section of the Los Angeles Area Chamber of 
Commerce. 
CHAIRMAN: OK. That's Bernard ..... 
MR. LESAGE: LeSage. We have -- I'm here really to 
say that the Board of the Los Angeles Area Chamber of Com-
merce has considered the non-unanimous criminal jury ver-
dicts in connection with the Speedy Trial Initiative, or the 
so-called "Speedy Trial Initiative," which has a few provi-
sions which are slightly different than this, but essentially 
encompass the same concept. We have prepared as part of the 
committee a summary of our arguments which we considered pro 
and con. I don't know it will be helpful for you. It 
might shorten what I have to say here. 
CHAIRMAN: We'd love to have it, in any case. 
MR. LESAGE: Our committee heard many of the speakers 
which you heard here this afternoon. Among others, Jerry 
Delman, in favor. We discussed with many meetings the 
drafters of the initiative; we heard from representatives of 
the Police Department; from Distr t Attorney's Office; and 
from the Public Defender's Office. Pretty much a cross 
section of all of those particular associations who have 
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s , as 
ses, which estab-
I 
i sue was funda-
mental respect that we had for the jury system in general, 
that the jurors in fact take on very seriously, to take the 
duty upon themselves very S(' iou:;ly to consider very care-
fully the reasonable doubt of guilt, and that we felt that 
the 10-2 under those circumstances would still result in a 
fair trial, given the fundamental trust in the jury system. 
The jury -- the composition of the jury has changed con-
siderably from when it was f st developed. I think you 
have all probably heard quite a history about it, but the 
changing complexion of our society and, therefore, changing 
complexion of the jury panels that we are faced with, seemed 
to indicate that you have the possibility of a one juror 
holdout, an unreasonable one juror holdout, or even two, is 
not that uncommon when we discussed it with various district 
attorneys and public defenders who have experience in the 
field, none of which -- although there was one member that 
was a former district attorney and a former defense attorney 
on our committee. We went to those people who are in the 
field and found that, although their experience was not ex-
tensive, they did not have a whole lot of cases that were 
hung up by one apparently unreasonable juror, or two un-
reasonable jurors -- it did occur, and it was all their 
experience as well that subsequent to just one or two persons 
who are unreasonable they would try it again, and they al-
ways won, resulting in just really a waste of time. Some 
of those trials are not short trials, they go on for quite 
some time, and there is a considerable amount of expense 
resulting from it. So, that sort of balancing of the expense, 
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where we came down on it. 
SENATOR DAVIS: Are you an attorney, Mr. LeSage? 
MR. LE SAGE: s, I am. 
SENATOR DAVIS: LeSage means 
}ffi. LE SAGE: Or wisecracker, I 
se one, I guess. 
1 t know which one. 
SENATOR DAVIS: In your committee did you 
mous verdict in favor of? 
a unani-
MR. LE SAGE: We did indeed, though there were two 
members who weren't sent, and I ieve one those mem-
bers probably would have voted against, or would have ab-
stained, one of the two. 
SENATOR DAVIS: I want to commend you for the scholaDi-
ness of your presentation. It shows kind a pragmatic 
business evaluation of the process which I find missing from 
so many presentations. The Professor of Government came in. 
He didn't try to us how we should think, he tried to 
tell us the facts. And so I ..... 
MR. LE SAGE: I think that was Jerry Uelman. 
SENATOR 




-- an i name from Claremont. 
him. 
CHAIRMAN: Before you leave, I too appreciate the degree 
of thoughtfulness in weighing both sides of the argument and 
the conclusions that you carne to. I'm a 1 tle bit concerned 
because I haven't seen -- perhaps you have -- some empirical 
demonstration that there are a significant number -- let's 
just take the 10-2 situation -- of hung juries where you have 
two unreasonable jurors. Obviously unreasonableness is to 
some extent in the eyes of the beholder, and if I were at the 
losing end of a case and felt there should have been a con-
viction, and that two people held out, I might consider their 
actions unreasonable, even though to those people, and maybe 
the rest of the world, their actions might be very reason-
able. Could you give us some insight into the kinds of cases 
that were put before you, and whether there was actual data 
put before you on whether these were people who were relating 
situations that they had experienced, that stood out very 
much in their minds, because they didn't like the results and 
the outcome, and you had maybe a bad situation? 
MR. LESAGE: Well, I'll tell you what information we 
did have so you can use that in your evaluation of taking our 
comments and our decision that was made by the Board, and 
that is that one of our members is Frank Zolin, who is the 
Executive Director of the Los Angeles Superior Court, which 
was our primary source for statistics on how many 10-2, 
11-1 type of cases there are. He has to admit, and I think 
I would report to you here that there are no definitive 
statements in Los Angeles County which establish exactly how 
many of those types of cases there are that would fall within 
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that type 
e se 't been 
matter 
fairly well ver 
CHAIRMAN: Ami 
uncomfortable about that? 














MR. LESAGE: No. I'll where we came up --
the approximation of 350 tr 
because you are a state 
s is a 1 e misnomer here, 
Los Angeles, and Frank 
us who are in 
sents the Los Angeles 
County, that's an based s review of the 
statistics that are available in Los Angeles County, which 
have somewhat the same 
lier about certa percentages of s 




gures are availab 
that in Los Angeles 
that would be saved 
to come to this type of conclusion 
would mean approximately 350 trials 
provision 
a 10-2 conviction. And 
as far as facts and statist s 
We are trying to grapple with the same idea 
would provide 
we could do 
s County area. 
what are we 
talking about in terms of time when we are ing to juxto-
pose that with the t's r s? s of savings 
are we looking for in ; also what types of savings are 
we looking for in response to the victim so they don't have 
to go through the trial -- one tr s it hung 
-1 
up and they come back to testify again about the blood and 
detail. Those types of considerations against making sure, 
that we all wanted to make sure that the rights of the de-
fendant were protected, but he has fundamentally a fair trial. 
And when you start balancing those you can't come up with 
hard numbers, and we looked long and hard -- we went to Steven 
Trott, and I don't think he has any figures either --in fact 
he came to our committee actual figures. I think somebody 
in the future will, because obviously they are ascertainable, 
but they are not in existence as best we know it at this point 
in time. We may be mistaken, but we looked pretty hard for 
them. 
CHAIRMAN: I guess one of the concerns I have in this 
whole subject matter area is that if you look at the hung 
juries and then you look at the 11-1 and 10-2s, there either 
is some assumption being made that an 11-1 or 10-2 leaves the 
one and the two people who hold out in an inherently unreason-
able position, or someone has some knowledge somewhere that 
there are a certain number of unreasonable holdouts, and 
that the best that I have heard on that question is anecdotal 
testimony, and we have sort of an inverted pyramid being 
built up. Down there somewhere someone said, Yes, I know 
of an 11-1 case where the holdout was unreasonable and, 
therefore, in all these cases the holdouts are unreasonable. 
And yes, I know of a 10-2 case -- I haven't heard of a 10-2 
case yet where the two holdouts have been demonstrated to 
be unreasonable. There was some suspicion given on the part 
of one of the judges this morning that in a series of cases 
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that were d bigo re -- b was cause 




a lot of unreasonable 





10-2 cases. I 
many are un-
MR. LE SAGE: Right. I 's one the pro-
blems with es on the s we have and 
recognize it as a problem, because you have to assume that 
that one person, if diligent, has reasonable doubt as to 
that person's guilt for that particular crime. The only 
thing that you can rely upon is the best judgment of 
those p been involved those types of situa-
tions, such as the defense and prosecuting s, who 
as then poll the jurors afterwards try asc 
best they can -- and even then they are not absolutely cer-
tain, because that's certainly within -- something that's a 
subjective ement can never even be cer then 
exactly what the basis was, whether was an unreason-
able basis, or whether was some rea e sis for 
it. I think that where you have to come down on that is 
that where you have a s ten people who have ser-
iously considered the evidence, even though there may be 
one or two people who have a reasonable doubt as to that 
person's guilt ..... 
CHAIRMAN: Are you talking about the decison of the 
jury? 
MR. LE of j -- let's say you 
-1 
get to the -- let's take a premise of 10-2 or 11-1 for con-
viction, and that person will be found guilty under this par-
ticular format. We'll never really know whether that person 
had a reasonable doubt which was justified by the evidence, 
or whether it was just some preconceived aspect of this per-
son's personality which sort of led him to interpret the 
evidence unreasonably, or whatever the cause was, they have 
decided that he is not guilty. You will never really under-
stand that no matter how long you compute those figures, and 
I think fundamentally you have to come to the conclusion in 
order to support this position and I think this is where 
our committee and the Board came to -- is that where you have 
12 people making that serious effort and not taking away 
anything from those one or two people who are found not guilty, 
but you probably have a very safe and more than a safe, you 
have a probability, and I think more than a probability you 
have someone who is probably guilty, and that that person 
probably ought to serve a sentence, perhaps taking into con-
sideration those other two juror's verdicts, but whatever, 
that person is guilty of that particular crime. I mean, 
that person got a fair trial and, therefore, whatever the 
unreasonableness -- you really can't couch it that way, be-
cause there is no way to completely ever understand that. 
CHAIRMAN: Can a probably guilty person be an innocent 
person? 
MR. LE SAGE: Do you mean could there be a mistake in 
the system with a 10-2? 
CHAIRHAN: Isn't it more likely ..... 
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MR. LE SAGE: It more 1 d be a 
mistake, I se, a 12-0 s, is one 
of the -offs to cons to 
your conclusion is -- once you start dovm 
the range, that's why there are a certain number Senators 
and Assemblymen. You have a certain j s be-
ing rendered on a particular 
innocence, or not. The more 
sue, whether 's guilt or 
you get involved in that 
process perhaps the better integrity you have for a correct 
to what a reason-result. But, at some point you 
able judgment in a particular case you cannot ever, even 
with 12 people unanimous, or people unanimous, or 100 peo-
ple unanimous, you still can't come to that conclusion that 
that person really is guilty. I mean there is always the 
possibility that that person was framed, that some other 
circumstances about him ..... 
CHAIRMAN: Even with a unanimous t? 
MR. LE SAGE: Even with a unanimous verdict. 
CHAIP~N: If you dilute to some extent -- if di-
lute to some extent the perfection of the decision-making 
process to the extent it's achievable, t are the offsetting 
benefits? You mention the cost benefits, or efficiency bene-
fits, that are considered. Were there any other benefits 
that the Chamber in particular considered in coming to its 
conclusion, besides the question of cost effec 
efficiency? 
MR. LE SAGE: Well, I think fundamentally 
ss and 
wasn't 
so much as putting a scale and adding the benefits versus 
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the burdens. If you come to the position that you are funda-
mentally going to have 12 people who are going to do the best 
job they can, and that this person gets a fair trial, and 10 
people come to the conclusion that he is guilty, then we're 
satisfied as a society that that person is guilty. And I 
think the benefits go from all the way down the line. I mean 
there's money benefits obviously; there are benefits to the 
victims; there are benefits to resolving that issue, even 
from the defendant's point of view, because if you look at 
those figures that are available from the numbers that go 
back into the system and are convicted, it's very close to 
100% the second time around, whether it's the perfection of 
the lawyer's skills, or whether you have just another jury 
panel, or what, there are very, very, very few instances 
where you have that unreasonable jury situation where the 
second time around the person is not convicted by a unani-
mous verdict jury. And I think that the integrity of the 
system includes a judge who is attuned to that, the prosecutor 
who won't prosecute again if there is a reasonable doubt, and 
those types of things are built into a system because there 
are a lot of people out there trying to make sure that just 
results happen. The judge is there, the attorneys are 
there from both sides, you have 12 jurors there, and every-
body really there is trying to make sure that we only con-
vict the guilty and that the free person is let off. I 
think the system is still going to work, but it will work 
a little more efficiently with 10-2. You know you can't --
you cannot get ..... It is a philosophical issue I think to a 
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certain extent, and is no 
looking for. I don't think you 
answer. 
CHAIRMAN: I 
sponses. I think you have 
d answer are 
are to find the hard 
responses, your direct re-
helpful to me What vote 
is necessary in order to cormnit the 
on an issue such as this? 
to a position 
MR. SAGE: In particular case -- I was at 
meeting -- of our meeting -- which was unanimously voted. 
CHAIRMAN: It happened to be unanimous. But, was a 
unanimous vote required? 
MR. LE SAGE: No. It was just a majority. And also 
I don't know any -- we had a we lacked a quorum the 
first time that this issue came up to the Board of Directors. 
They voted without a quorum 100% and I understand without 
having been there, everybody else who wasn't there even-
tually voted in favor of this as well. So, that the Board 
of Directors, which represents sort of a cross section of 
the business in Los Angeles County -- and those are the Di-
rectors themselves -- I am not a Director. The Chair of our 
Committee is a Director, but the Directors themselves are 
the only ones who can vote 
behalf of the Chamber for this. 
take a position on 
It is my understanding that 
they voted unanimously in favor of this. 
SENATOR DAVIS: :t:1r. Chairman. 
CHAIP~N: Senator 
SENATOR DAVIS: Is true that the Greater Los Angeles 
Chamber of Commerce Board of Directors encompasses Los 
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Angeles County and San Bernardino County, and Riverside 
County, and Orange County? 
MR. LESAGE: Yes. It's the Greater Los Angeles Area--
Los Angeles Southern California ..... 
SENATOR DAVIS: It's the great basin. 
MR. LESAGE: Yes. It's the Ventura, Santa Barbara, 
I think, Orange County. How far out -- I think it does go 
San Bernardino and Riverside as well. So, it's a big chunk 
of area. However, obviously ..... 
SENATOR DAVIS: Is part of it Los Angeles City and Los 
Angeles County? 
MR. LESAGE: Yes. That's true. 
CHAIR}~N: It follows the LA Metropolitan Water District. 
MR. LESAGE: I think that's about right. 
CHAIRMAN: Mr. LeSage, thank you very much for your 
testimony. Is there anyone else here today who would care 
to testify on this issue? If not, thank you all very much 
for attending. Oh, I have one announcement to make. 
SENATOR DAVIS: I would like you and Mr. Thomson to 
consider the practicality of going to Portland and listening 
for one day and maybe going to New Orleans and listening for 
one day to the Louisiana system ..... 
CHAIRMAN: OK. You've hit the good idea and the bet-
ter idea, but you haven't yet come to the best idea. And 
that was the one that you had at lunch -- that we study the 
non-unanimous jury in London. 
SENATOR DAVIS: The 10-2 in all of Great Britain should 
be investigated also. 
-133-
CHAIRMAN: Well, we' certainly look into I 
just wanted to announce 
ponents and opponents 
so we both pro-
measure were 
not able to attend, or some reason did not attend. On 
the proponent side we did invite Evelle Younger, former 
Attorney General; and Justice Robert are the co-
sponsors of the Criminal Courts Reform Initiative. We in-
vited the California District Attorneys Association; and 
we did invite Chief Daryl Gates. On the opposition side we 
invited the Attorney General -- they were supposed to appear 
and did not. We invited the Friends Committee on Legisla-
tion -- they did not appear; and so the American Civil 
Liberties Union. We also invited the County Supervisors; 
the California Judges Association; the Judicial Council; 
and the State Bar of California, the last four having as 
yet taken no position on the Initiative -- on the Criminal 
Courts Reform Initiative. So, I just wanted you to know that 
we tried to get as many as we could. 
We are very pleased to have had your attendance. Thank 
you very much, members and staff, and all part s concerned --
Sergeants, Special Services, Recorders. 
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SENATE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT A 
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Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 10 
Introduced by Senator Preseley 
February 11, 1983 
Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 10--A resolution to 
propose to the people of the State of California an 
amendment to the Constitution of the state, by amending 
Section 16 of Article I thereof, relating to juries. 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST 
SCA 10, as introduced, Presley. Juries: criminal causes. 
Existing provisions of the constitution permit a verdict to be 
rendered in a civil cause by three-fourths of the jury and 
permit a jury to consist of 12 or fewer persons in misdemeanor 
criminal actions. 
This bill would provide that in a criminal action, other than 
for an offense punishable by death, five-sixths of the jury may 
render a verdict. 
Vote: %. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no. 
State-mandated local program: no. 
1 Resolved by the Senate, the Assembly concurring, That 
2 the Legislature of the State of California at its 1983-84 
3 Regular Session commencing on the sixth day of 
4 December, 1982, two-thirds of the members elected to 
5 each of the two houses of the Legislature voting therefor, 
6 hereby proposes to the people of the State of California 
7 that the Constitution of the state be amended by 
8 amending Section 16 of Article I thereof, as follows: 
9 SEC. 16. Trial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be 
10 secured to all, but in a civil cause three-fourths of the jury 
11 may render a verdict. A jury may be waived in a criminal 
12 cause by the consent of both parties expressed in open 
13 court by the defendant and the defendant's counsel. In a 
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(916} 445-5957 
Section 16 of Article 1 of the California Constitution has been 
consistently interpreted by the courts to require that jury 
verdicts in criminal cases be agreed upon unanimously. SCA 10 
would instead permit a verdict in a non-capital criminal case to 
be agreed upon by only five-sixths of the jurors. 
Since the California Constitution generally mandates a 12 person 
jury for criminal trials, SCA 10 would permit a conviction or 
acquittal of the charge by a 10-2 vote. For misdemeanor trials 
where the parties agree upon a lesser number of jurors, SCA 10 
would permit a decision by five-sixths of the jurors. [However, 
the minimum constitutionally permissible jury size appears to be 
at least seven when the verdict may be decided upon 
non-unanimously. Although the parties could agree to a six 
member jury and SCA 10 would permit a verdict by five members of 
that jury, the United States Supreme Court has held unanimously 
that "conviction by a non-unanimous six member jury in a state 
criminal trial for a non-petty offense deprives an accused of his 
constitutional right to trial by jury." See Burch v. Louisiana 
(1979) 441 u.s. 130.) 
Except for prohibiting a conviction by five-sixths of a six 
member jury, federal constitutional law does not bar a state from 
using non-unanimous jury verdicts in criminal cases. In 1972, 
the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue and narrowly 
upheld non-unanimous jury verdicts in state criminal trials 
against equal protection and due process challenges. In Johnson 




and in Aeocada v. 
Both ru!~ngs were 
197 
to 
s. 404 1 2 
There are, however, 
weighed. Generally, 
make four points. 
1. Nonunanimity 
and retrials 
2. It would resolve the problem of 
3. It would reduce the problem 
single corrupt juror could no 
vote. 
expense of trials 
juries. 
juror. 
ion since a 
deciding 
4. It would be more democratic requirement of 
unanimity enables one person to overcome the interest of 
others and thwart the major 11. 
Those against non-unanimous verdicts have 
arguments. 
1. Change to a non-unanimous 
s or 
percentage of hung cases 
because many are dismissed 
are pleaded to by defendant. 
would still occur under a non-unan 
2. Unanimity is es 1 to 
to confidence in our legal 
fairness of verdicts. 
3. The problem of jury tampering is 
warrant preventive measures as 
the unanimity principle. Less 




strict attorney or 
, hung juries 
system. 
f to 
as elimination of 
alternatives are 
of laws against 
4. Unanimity is necessary to ensure respons le liberation 
and careful weighing of the evidence in a dispute. Under 
a non-unanimous system, a jury may simply stop 
deliberating when reaches the site maj 
5. The need for unanimity s requirement that 
juries be selected from a representative cross-section of 
the community because it gives each juror, even members 
of small minorities, a voice. Non-unanimous verdicts 
B-2 
Members, Senate Judiciary Committee 
Page 3 
might have the effect of disenfranchising minority groups 
from effective participation in the legal system. 
6. Unanimity supports the social decision that it is far 
worse to convict an innocent person than to let a guilty 
person go free. 
This memorandum presents only a brief overview of the issues 
raised by SCA 10. For a more complete discussion, please refer 
to the attached committee analysis of SCA 10. 
GWW/sw 
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NON-UNANIMOUS JURY VERDICTS 
-CRIMINAL CASES-
HISTORY 
Source: L.A. District Attorney 
Prior Legislation: SCA 22 (1971) - held in this 
committee 
Support: CDAA; State Chamber of Commerce; CPOA; 
State Sheriffs and Police Chiefs 
Ass'n; L.A. Chamber of Commerce; L.A. 
County Sheriff; numerous individuals 
Opposition: Attorney General; State Public 
Defender; ACLU: CACJ; CTLA; 
California Public Defenders Ass'n; 
Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n 
KEY ISSUE 
INSTEAD OF UNANIMOUS VERDICTS, SHOULD ONLY 10 OUT 
OF 12 JURORS BE ABLE TO RENDER A VERDICT IN 
NON-CAPITAL CRIMINAL CASES? 
PURPOSE 
The California courts have consistently 
interpreted the California Constitution as 
requiring that a jury verdict in a criminal case 





















SCA 10 (Pres 
Page 3 
Opponents argued that SCA 10 would 
result in a deterioration of justice. 
It would short-circuit meaningful 
deliberation by juries (see Comment 8), 
threaten minority representation on 
juries (see Comment 10) , undercut the 
DA's burden to prove his case beyond a 
reasonable doubt (see Comment 9) , 
undermine public confidence in the 
system, could result in the freeing of 
guilty offenders, and would not save 
significant time or money (see Comment 
11) . 
Several possible drafting defects were 
also noted (see Comment 13). 
There are other approaches to the 
problem (see Comment 14). 
2. Non-unanimous verdicts permitted by U.S. 
Supreme Court 
(a) Johnson and Apodaca 
The U.S. Supreme Court considered the 
question of whether criminal verdicts 
need be unanimous in the cases of Johnson 
v. Louisiana (1972) 406 U.S. 356 and 
Apodaca v. Oregon (1972) 406 U.S. 404, 
and divided 4 to 4 to 1. Justices White, 
Burger, Blackmun, and Rehnquist held that 
the Constitution did not require a 
unanimous' verdict. Justices Stewart, 
Brennan, Marshall, and Douglas held that 
it did. The final justice, Powell, held 
that the 6th Amendment to the U.S. 
















SCA 10 (Presley) 
Page 5 
unanimous verdict in some felony cases, but 
the Legislature has thus far not done so. 
4. History of unanimous verdicts - no impediment 
Unanimity has been a part of the common law 
tradition for over 600 years. The first case 
in which it was recorded that the jury had to 
be unanimous was decided in 1367. In the 
latter half of the 14th century it became 
settled that a verdict had to be unanimous, 
and unanimity was an accepted feature of the 
common-law jury by the 18th century. 
However, according to Professor Alan Scheflin 
of the University of Santa Clara Law School, 
historical arguments for the unanimity 
requirement for the most part are not 
conclusive. He stated that the history of the 
unanimity rule "is shrouded in mystery," and 
that "of the many different theories virtually 
none of them apply to the legal procedures 
that we have today." He concluded that 
historical tradition was not an impediment to 
the enactment of this measure. 
5. Number of hung juries -- scant evidence on 
subject 
Proponents offer SCA 10 as a way of reducing 
the "substantial number" of hung juries in 
criminal cases. Unfortunately, there exists 
very little empirical data on the number of 
hung juries in criminal trials. The following 
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The study showed that about 8% (136 of 
1794) of the juries hung in the CDAA 
counties and 9% (30 of 317) in Ventura. 
Of those, 41% (56 of 136) were hung 11-1 
or 10-2 for guilty in the 20 CDAA 
counties and 40% (12 of 30) were hung 
11-1 or 10-2 for guilty in Ventura 
County. Within that group, about 60% to 
67% were hung 11-1 for conviction. 
(d) OC ... TP study 
A 1975 study ("Empirical Study of 
Frequency of Occurrence, Causes, Effects 
and Amount of Time Consumed by Hung 
Juries" for O.C.J.P. by Planning and 
Management Consulting Corp.) shows a 
three year aggregate statewide total for 
hung juries at 977 of 8,011 jury verdicts 
for the period 1970 to 1972, or a rate of 
12.1%. Of these cases, 41% were 
subsequently dismissed, 33% 
plea-bargained, and 26% re-tried at an 
estimated cost (in 1975) of $8.7 million. 
The study also found that 29.3% of these 
cases hung at 11-1 or 10-2 for guilty and 
9.6% of them hung at 11-1 of 10-2 for not 
guilty. 
6. Substantial cost savings asserted 
In Los Angeles one day of a felony jury trial 
costs $4,285. The Los Angeles District 
Attorney estimates that the average felony 
jury trial lasts 4 days, and then multiplies 
that by $4,285 and by the 393 hung juries in 
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This could result in a reduction of the cost 
savings from SCA 10. 
8. Effect on jury behavior 
Justice Powell and the proponents of this bill 
argue that the removal of the unanimity 
requirement would minimize the chance that a 
jury would be hung by one irrational juror. 
District attorneys claim that the irrational 
juror is an all too common phenomenon. 
A number of former jurors, however, support 
the unanimity requirement because of its 
effect on the deliberations. The need to 
convince every juror results in a more 
thorough consideration of the evidence by all 
jurors. In contrast the deliberations in the 
Apodaca case, in which the defendant was 
convicted of assault with a deadly weapon, 
burglary in a dwelling, and grand larceny, 
lasted only 41 minutes. 
A survey of all felony jury verdicts in 
Multnomah County (Portland) Oregon which uses 
a 10 - 2 system, for a three year period· 
ending in 1983 indicates that abolishment of 
the unanimity requirement affects jury · 
deliberations and removes motivation for the 
jurors to continue deliberating after they 
have reached the 10 or 11 votes necessary fo·r 
a verdict. That survey shows that only 44% of 
the convictions were arrived at unanimously 
while 56% were arrived at by either an 11 - 1 
or 10 - 2 vote. 
WOULD THE DELIBERATIVE PROCESS SUFFER IF 
VERDICTS MAY BE REACHED NON-UNANIMOUSLY? 
(More) 
C-9 
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panel members of a different race, class, sex 
or status. 
This argument was rejected by the majority 
for two reasons. They first said that while 
the Constitution requires the participation 
of all groups in the overall jury process, it 
does not require the representation of any 
particular group on any particular jury, and 
thus clearly does not require that a member 
of a particular group vote for conviction in 
order for that conviction to be valid. In 
addition the majority refused to assume that 
a majority of jurors would "deprive a man of 
his liberty on the basis of prejudice when a 
minority is presenting a reasonable argument 
in favor of acquittal." (Apodaca v. Oregon.) 
Justice Powell added briskly that there is a 
risk under any system that a jury will fail 
to meet its responsibilities, and that he 
found nothing in Oregon's experience to 
indicate that non-unanimous juries we~e more 
irresponsible than others. 
11. Opposition arguments 
(a) Attorney General 
In opposing this bill the Attorney 
General stated: 
Eliminating the traditional 
protection of the unanimous jury 
verdict is a major and symbolic 
departure from one of the most 
fundamental principles of our 
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(c) 
And however convenient these 
[attacks] may appear at first, 
{as doubtless all arbitrary 
powers, well ~xecuted, are the 
most convenient) yet let it be 
again remembered, that delays, 
and little inconveniences in the 
forms of justice, are the price 
that all free nations must pay 
for their liberty in more 
substantial matters; that these 
inroads upon this sacred bulwark 
of the nation are fundamentally 
opposite to the spirit of our 
Constitution; and that, though 
begun in trifles, the precedent 
may gradually increase and 
spread, to the utter disuse of 
juries in questions of the most 
momentous concern. 
Defense bar 
In addition to the arguments 
already discussed, the defense 
groups also raised the following 
arguments at the interim hearing. 
(1) Change to a non-unanimous 
system would not result in 
great savings of time or 
expense. Only a very 
small percentage of jury 
trials hang (about 12% to 
15%) and less than a 
majority of those hung 
cases were deadlocked 10 -
2 or 11 - 1. Further, only 
(More) 
C-13 
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system still adhere to the 
requirement of unanimity. 
(7) Abolition of the unanimity 
requirement would create a 
precedent for further 
dilution of the right to 
jury trial. 
12. Bffect on smaller jury 
Under existing law, the Constitution permits 
parties to a misdemeanor trial to agree to a 
jury less than 12. On May 17, this Committee 
approved SCA 32 (Boatwright) which would 
permit the Legislature to set the number of 
jurors in misdemeanor cases at 6 or more. 
This bill provides that a verdict could be 
rendered by five-sixths of the jury. 
However, the minimum constitutionally 
permissible jury size appears to be at least 
seven when the verdict may be decide~upon 
non-unanimously. Although the parties could 
agree to a six member jury (or the 
Legislature could provide for a 6 person jury 
if SCA 32 passes) and SCA 10 would appear to 
permit a verdict by five members of that jury 
the United States Supreme Court has held 
unanimously that "conviction by a 
non-unanimous six member jury in a state 
criminal trial for a non-petty offense 
deprives an accused of his constitutional 
right to trial by jury." See Burch v. 
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(b) Unanimous verdicts required for lesser 
included offenses 
Under existing law, a jury in a first 
degree murder case may find the 
defendant guilty of a lesser included 
offense (second degree murder or 
manslaughter) when they are not 
convinced on the capital charge. 
That practice would continue under 
this bill, but the jury would be 
required to be in unanimous agreement 
on the lesser included offense. A 10 
- 2 or 11 - 1 vote would not be 
sufficient to return a verdict of 
manslaughter in a capital case since 
the language of the measure would 
require unanimous verdicts in any 
criminal action for a capitol offense. 
The problem could be resolved by 
requiring a unanimous verdict only for 
a conviction of first degree murder. 
14. Alternative approaches 
(a) Component in Criminal Court Reform 
Initiative 
A provision in the Criminal Court 
Reform Initiative, which is in the 
process of being qualified for the 
ballot and which is backed by the 
source of SCA 10, would also allow 
non-unanimous verdicts in non-capital 
cases. However, the language of the 
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tq "an ll";"~l system wou"id meet the 
proponerttS'" ~prim~£y ~~~ncern since the 
chance of two obstinate jurors being 
selected for the same jury see~s 
remote. 
*********** 
C-19 

